

# A Framework for the Classification of Personality Components

John D. Mayer

University of New Hampshire

**ABSTRACT** Psychologists working within different theoretical traditions have proposed the existence of hundreds of personality components since the turn of the century. For example, psychoanalysts proposed such components as the id, ego, and superego, and trait theorists proposed such components as introversion and extraversion. Because each proposed component models a part of internal psychological functioning, it would make sense to combine the components into a single more meaningful set. Such components, however, are generally discussed only within the specific theoretical tradition in which they originated. This article presents a classification system that treats personality components together as a group. Personality components were first defined and then several hundred components were collected in a preliminary theory-by-theory classification. A new relational classification system was then developed that organized the components according to their inter-related nature, without regard to their originating theories. This classification

A number of people graciously assisted me with this work. Hans G. Hirsch was kind enough to translate portions of Mendelssohn's *Essays on Sensation* from the German to help clarify the manner in which early faculty psychologists identified personality components. Dennis Mitchell and Glenn Geher participated in the exploratory but demanding reliability studies of the classification system and made numerous suggestions for clarifying the concepts and presentation of the material. A number of my colleagues commented on early versions of the manuscript, including Ellen Cohn, Victor Benassi, and Becky Warner. Richard Kushner, Bill Peterson, and Dennis Mitchell read and commented on later versions of the manuscript. I am also grateful for the additional comments from students in my Spring 1994 graduate seminar on Personality and Emotion. Finally, the enthusiastic comments of David Sugarman and Susan Nolan enabled me to maintain my composure while making the changes everyone else suggested. To all these people I extend my heartfelt thanks. Correspondence regarding this manuscript may be sent to John (Jack) D. Mayer, Department of Psychology, Conant Hall, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824.

*Journal of Personality* 63:4, December 1995. Copyright © 1995 by Duke University Press. CCC 0022-3506/95/\$1.50

system can be used to construct a relational table of personality components that is loosely analogous to a chemist's periodic table of the elements. The relational classification system's potential contribution to personality psychology is discussed.

Personality can be conceptualized as a set of components that function together as a system (Pervin, 1990). These components vary greatly both in the attention they have received and in their intrinsic qualities. A few personality components, such as the inferiority complex (Adler, 1964), have so captured the public's imagination that they have become a part of everyday understanding, whereas other components are obscure even within the field, such as the *enantiodromia*<sup>1</sup> (Jung, 1921/1923, p. 541). Some personality components are said to have a near-imperial reach, such as the ego, which is defined as governing all conscious and much unconscious cognition (Freud, 1923/1960). Other components, such as *n* Achievement, are smaller in reach but appear to predict particular accomplishments in people's lives (Murray, 1938). And although some components are thoroughly contemporary in their conceptualization, such as the self-schema (Markus, 1977), others, such as canalization (Murphy, 1947), appear out-of-date and as a consequence are rarely studied. Whatever their differences, each of these components can be thought of as a model of what an actual subsystem of personality is like. A more comprehensive understanding of personality could be created by studying these numerous components as a single group, but this has not yet been done.

During the first half of the twentieth century, psychologists were guided by several competing theoretical perspectives on personality, including the psychodynamic, trait, and humanistic approaches. Adherents to a given approach typically studied the particular components relevant to their theoretical perspective. For example, psychodynamic psychologists studied such components as the id, ego, and superego, and trait psychologists studied such components as extraversion and *n* Achievement. Although the field of personality psychology is far more integrated today, the study of personality components remains partially divided according to those original theoretical perspectives. Even today, discussion of the ego takes place largely within psychodynamic psychology, whereas discussion of the closely related self-schema takes

1. An *enantiodromia* is an (often) unconscious trend to think the opposite of what one is currently thinking or saying.

place among social cognitivists, and any comparison of the two is the exception (Westen, 1991). The result is that any given set of personality components seems incomplete by itself, as well as partially redundant with sets arising from other perspectives. The integration of such diverse sets of components within a single framework could potentially yield an enriched understanding of the personality system.

### Purpose of This Article

Given that most psychologists today view personality as a system, the analysis of that system's parts seems essential. Such an analysis can be facilitated by developing a classification system that collects personality components and groups together those that are similar. Collecting a wide variety of components, such as the aforementioned inferiority complex, ego, *n* Achievement, and self-schema, facilitates identifying those that might bear on a particular research problem. Moreover, grouping similar ones together helps define them: The ego can be better understood by comparing it with the self-schema, and so on. The enhanced ability to identify relevant components and compare those that are similar are two illustrations of the more general principle that personality components are better evaluated in groups. In part this is because components are models of the actual systems of personality and those actual systems are themselves likely to be arranged in groups as well as to blend together. To some extent, therefore, the identification of an optimal set of such components is a matter of grouping related functions and deducing the best ways to carve up the more-or-less continuous operations of personality. Once a set of components is selected, it can be evaluated according to how extensively it covers personality function, the convergent and discriminant validity of components within the set, and so forth (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959). For example, such a classification system would make clear that replacing the ego with the self-schema would omit certain parts of personality because the self-schema is "smaller" than the ego (i.e., includes fewer structures or processes).

Despite the importance of classifying components, attempts to study them have been impeded both because of the complexity of the problem and because of the persistent influence of behaviorism in psychology, which discouraged consideration of speculative models of internal functioning (Mayer, 1994). Some theorists have nevertheless attempted to develop classifications of one specific type of component, such as

mental faculties (see Hilgard, 1980, for a history) or traits (Buss & Finn, 1987); such approaches are, however, limited by their restricted focus. In addition, other researchers have developed working outlines for possible classification systems in order to organize the variables they employed in their empirical work. For example, Barratt (1985) identified the four major components of personality as behavior, cognition, brain, and environment; McClelland (1984a) identified traits, schemas, needs, and the self-schema. Both of these outlines have merit as models but are limited by the vagueness of their categories (e.g., cognition, brain). The approach employed here both includes all types of components and employs hundreds of specific examples. Its more highly developed end product, a relational classification system, can be used to organize specific personality components according to their inter-relatedness. Moreover, a relational table of personality components can be constructed from the classification system that is loosely analogous to a chemist's periodic table of the elements.

### **Organization of this Article**

The present article is divided into six sections. The above introduction was the first section. It is followed by a second section covering basic issues concerning personality components, a third section that describes the collection of about 400 personality components (sorted by theoretical perspective), a fourth section that describes the integration of these components into a relational table of personality components, a fifth, discussion section, and a conclusion.

### **Basic Issues Concerning Personality Components**

#### **Epistemology of Personality Components**

Personality components are abstract models of personality subsystems and have typically arisen in several ways. The first psychological components likely to have been identified, because of their obvious manifestations, were sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. These five senses were already treated as a set by the time of the Renaissance (Lewis, 1970, pp. 156–162). In contrast, personality components that were less directly observable had to be postulated on the basis of a theoretical rationale. There were at least three such rationales for proposing person-

ality components: the existence of independent mental functions, the presence of individual differences, and analogies to systems in general.

The earliest rationale for personality components argued that because certain mental functions operated independently of one another, they therefore must have different origins. In the 18th century, Moses Mendelssohn, who first compared cognitive, conative, and affective components (Hilgard, 1980), distinguished the three in part on the basis that they behaved differently from one another, and sometimes even interfered with one another. For example, he wrote that when reason (cognition) "laboriously investigates the origin of pleasure," it may destroy pleasure (Mendelssohn, 1755/1971, p. 66). Independence among the components was also evident from their different responses to external influences. Mendelssohn noted that "[rational] Convictions, by their very nature, cannot be influenced by coercion or bribe. They belong in the realm of man's cognitive power. Their only criterion is whether they are true or untrue . . ."; in contrast, a person's will would be encouraged or discouraged by "reward and punishment" (Mendelssohn, 1783/1969, p. 44).

In the 19th century, a second argument for distinct personality components emerged on the basis of observed individual differences in behavior (see Allport, 1937, pp. 81–83). According to this logic, if two people behaved differently, it was because one possessed more or less of an internal component than the other did. For example, a person who excelled in the arts might be said to possess an aesthetic-sensibility component that was relatively powerful compared to that of another person who was less adept in the arts. Such reasoning was first employed by the ill-fated phrenologist movement, but was later employed as the logic underlying traits. By the end of the 19th century, a sufficient number of personality components had been distinguished by observing independent mental functions and individual differences that Wundt (1897, p. 26) could define personality psychology as the study of a system made up of such components.

The third argument for the existence of personality components gained currency in the early part of the 20th century and depended upon reasoning about systems in general. General Systems Theory was a scientific movement that attempted to delineate common principles that could be applied to particular classes of systems (von Bertalanffy, 1975). If diverse systems were constructed on the basis of common principles, then scientists could plausibly analogize from the components of one system to those of another. For example, the fact that most gov-

ernments possessed an executive officer suggested that so might most personality systems. Freud's (1923/1960) ego, and other hypothesized control processes such as Murray's regnant processes (Murray & Kluckhorn, 1956), arose in part from such logic. More complex processes could be described by such analogies as well. For example, many regulatory processes attempt to reduce discrepancies between actual and desired conditions. A thermostat that minimized the difference between the actual and target temperature could be used to describe a person's attempt to minimize the difference between his or her actual and ideal self. Processes that behaved in similar manners across diverse systems such as centralized control and regulation were termed isomorphisms (von Bertalanffy, 1967).

This last, systems argument is sufficiently general to include as special cases the earlier rationales for the existence of components involving "independent mental function" and "individual differences." For example, an individual differences explanation of a person who has difficulty paying attention is that the person has an impaired attentional system. This account can be conceptualized as depending upon an implicit comparison between the person and other systems that have similar deficits. For example, the explanation that the person possesses an impaired attentional system is roughly analogous to the explanation that a radio with poor reception has a faulty tuner. From this perspective, the epistemology of a personality component always begins with an analogy from a component in a system we do understand (e.g., a tuner in a radio) to what we suppose might exist in human psychology (e.g., an attentional component that "tunes in" relevant information). Finally, it is worth noting that the systems we do understand possess many components that differ in their formal attributes. For example, a government may possess an executive officer, but it may also possess a spirit of dialogue with the people, and these are plainly two different types of components. The next section will examine and discuss such differences so as to provide a foundation for classifying them.

### **A Preliminary Formal Description and Definition of Personality Components**

Components can be distinguished from one another according to a variety of partly interrelated characteristics such as their function, structure, content, and so on. Several among the more important of these

characteristics will be discussed below so as to form the basis both for the definition of a personality component and for the later relational classification of components.

### *Components and their modes of representation*

As stated earlier, a component models a part of personality. This model, as distinct from the part being modeled, is typically a verbal description of what the given portion of personality is or does. For example, Freud (1923/1960, p. 15) said that the ego "represents what may be called reason and common sense. . . ." In addition to verbally describing the component, many such models include a metaphorical extension, such as Freud's likening of the ego's rational control of irrational impulses to the position of a rider on a horse (1923/1960, p. 14). Such models may also include a mathematical extension, such as a factor analyst's definition of extraversion as a sum of a person's responses on particular test items. Whether a model is conveyed only verbally or with metaphorical or mathematical extensions depends largely on the theorist. Of greater concern here are those aspects of the model that reflect variations in the actual parts of personality themselves. Dimensions along which the parts of personality themselves may vary will be considered next.

### *Qualities of personality components*

*Functional aspects of components.* Most components are identified because they play some role in the function of the personality system. Although many components are dedicated to performing particular functions, others seem to function incidentally as a result of an individual's learning history or other influences. Examples of components with dedicated function include long-term memory, which is required for the organism to build complex representational structures (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), and surprise, which is a relatively stereotyped response to particular environmental triggers (Plutchik, 1980). Examples of components with functions that may have arisen more incidentally include self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970). That is, someone who succeeds at a Machiavellian scheme may be more apt to try it again. His or her repeated successes may lead to a Machiavellian tendency or com-

ponent. Although its metaphor is dated, Gardner Murphy's description of canalization outlines a similar incidental process

. . . by which general motives (which are at first rather nonspecifically related to a class of stimuli) tend, upon repeated experience, to become more easily satisfied through the action of the specific satisfier than of others of the same general class. . . . The energies awaiting an outlet break through the barrier at a given spot, are channeled or canalized in the process, and, as the barrier weakens, tend more and more to focus their pressure upon it. (1947, p. 162)

According to this description, some components' functions develop opportunistically, as does a river's channel cutting through sediment.

*Structure and content of components.* Personality components also vary according to their potential structural organization and content. They are often described as (a) integrated mechanisms, (b) groups of features, (c) contents, or (d) an additive combination of these. Integrated mechanisms possess interdependent and integrated subparts each one of which is necessary to the function of the unit. For example, one model of the memory network (Bower, 1981) divides it into concept nodes, the association paths that connect them, and the activation that flows or spreads from concept nodes along the connections. These three substructures operate together to represent memories, and each of the parts is necessary to the function of the mechanism.

In contrast to mechanisms, featural components are collections of subparts that share a family resemblance of some type, although they are not necessarily integrated with one another. For example, extraversion might be composed of neurological proclivities toward impulsiveness and liveliness, learned material concerning sociability, and a happy-go-lucky self-image. In such a featural group, one part neither uses nor relies on the other for its operation. Rather, each can operate independently, and each contributes to a collective mental quality. For example, extraversion can exist without a happy-go-lucky self-image, but adding the happy-go-lucky feature to extraversion strengthens its overall pattern. Of course, the features in such a group may well interact: A lively disposition is likely to establish a happy-go-lucky self-image, but it doesn't necessarily have to. This is why these are groups of features rather than mechanisms: It is possible in theory to have any of the above without the others.

Still another type of component is so heavily identified with its con-



tents that it makes sense to consider these contents as a partially independent entity. For example, certain memories that reside in long-term memory can be distinguished from long-term memory itself. An example is that of expert knowledge (e.g., of dinosaurs; Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988), which can be broken down into its contents and their interrelations, on the one hand, as distinct from the memory system that contains them, on the other. Contents are different from mechanisms because individual pieces of knowledge can be eliminated without disrupting the whole, and these contents are also different from featural components because the contents concern an object or topic such as dinosaurs or medical information rather than being grouped on the basis of a mutual resemblance.

A final structure is far more complex than the first three. Such structures involve additive combinations of mechanisms, featural collections, and contents; these additive combinations are so extensive that the resulting component is like a small personality except that it lacks one or more properties of the whole. For example, the ego has various intentions and is said to rationally control interactions with the outside world. It therefore contains both mechanisms of reason and mechanisms in the brain for the control of body movements (Freud, 1923/1960, p. 14). In addition, it contains and employs mechanisms of defense and dream works. A given ego may also contain multiple featural collections, such as features indicating its strength (Block & Block, 1980) or totalitarianism (Greenwald, 1980). Finally, the ego may contain certain contents, such as theories of others' personalities. The ego can be distinguished from the personality as a whole, however, in that it lacks the irrational, associationistic thinking of the id and the conscience of the superego.

*Location and boundaries.* A given personality component, whatever its form, structure, or content, must model a part of personality. As such, it represents some aspect of personality that can speculatively be said to reside *inside* the person, and most likely inside the brain or the psychological systems supported by the brain. More specifically, a component's position is often specified along a psychological continuum that can be conceived of as extending from the more molecular biological bases at which psychology begins (e.g., psychophysiology) to the more molar, outside systems toward which it reaches (e.g., the family and society). This continuum is almost universally recognized by psychologists. For example, theorists have often proposed pairs of

components that reflect this lower-upper opposition, such as the id versus the ego (Freud, 1923/1960), the unconditioned versus conditioned response (Skinner, 1974), and the genotypical versus the phenotypical trait (Allport, 1961).

As already noted, personality components also vary according to size. Freud's ego is a relatively large component that also includes numerous rational functions, body-projection regions, and other parts. A smaller component might be a single defense mechanism such as denial. Larger and smaller components can be organized hierarchically, as is implied when the ego is said to contain the mechanisms of defense. In addition, components of an intermediate size may be more meaningful to discuss than those that are either very large or small (e.g., basic level categories; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyers-Braem, 1976). For example, personologists may find it more convenient to speak of long-term memory than of its individual nodes and interconnections.

*Developmental consistency and universality.* Components vary substantially on how developmentally consistent they are during the lifespan, and how prevalent they are across personalities. Some components, such as memory or surprise, may be relatively stable over the lifespan in the sense that they perform roughly the same function in the same way. Other components, such as expert knowledge or ethical systems, may not be present in the infant or young child but rather develop over time. Similarly, memory will be present in all healthy individuals, whereas certain types of expert knowledge will be present only in some individuals.

### *Summary definition*

The above discussion can be summarized by way of a definition of personality components: A personality component is a model of a part of personality that can speculatively be said to reside inside the person, i.e., inside the brain or inside the psychological systems supported by the brain. Personality components are often identified according to their dedicated or incidental functions within the system. These components are often described as mechanisms localized in the brain (e.g., the memory), or as collections of common features that are emergent or abstracted from across psychological subsystems (e.g., extraversion), or as composed of mental contents (e.g., expert knowledge), or as additive combinations of all of these (e.g., ego). Personality components

model systems at different psychological levels, and of different sizes at those levels. Such components may be stable or change, and may be essentially universal across personalities or may vary from individual to individual.

A slightly extended version of this definition can be used to make reliable discriminations between those personality terms that designate components versus those that do not. A colleague and I independently rated seven pages of terms haphazardly selected from the glossaries of three personality textbooks (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992; McAdams, 1990; Pervin, 1993). We agreed that 87 of the 170 terms designated personality components, 72 did not, and disagreed about 11 terms (93% agreement,  $\chi^2 = 128.7, p < .01$ ).<sup>2</sup>

2. Our extended definition started with what appears in this article, and then continued with:

Various examples of personality components include those that might model internal systems (e.g., memory), states (e.g., anger), tendencies (e.g., self-actualization), discrepancies (e.g., actual-ideal self), mechanisms (e.g., repression), perceptions and meanings (e.g., personal constructs), patterns of thoughts (e.g., authoritarianism), neural networks (e.g., memory networks), behavioral tendencies (e.g., honesty), behavioral programs (e.g., habits), processes (e.g., canalization), and so on.

One of the most difficult discriminations to make is between a process that is, and a process that is not, a personality component. Certain descriptions of personality sometimes refer to external, perhaps physical, laws according to which personality operates; these do not refer to personality components because such laws are universal; they do not describe something unique to personality, but merely a process it, as well as other, systems follow. For example, when the term entropy is employed to refer to the increasing energy loss and disorganization that may occur in personality, it is not a component because it is not a special feature of personality. By comparison, Freud's pleasure principle, despite the universal and abstract sound of "principle," is actually a process followed by the id (but not the ego); it is somehow embedded or "wired into" portions of personality functioning. For that reason, it is a component.

Another discrimination that must sometimes be made is when the *same* term is used to refer to a personality component and a noncomponent. Often, the discrimination relies on whether the term depicts something occurring inside or outside the personality. For example, if the term *modeling* refers to a mental process of observing and learning from an external actor, it can be considered a component. But if the term is employed to refer only to a therapeutic intervention or experimental technique, it should not be considered a component. Similarly, self-actualization can refer either to a tendency toward growth or a stage of development; only the first meaning refers to a component.

Easier discriminations occur between those descriptors that are not components because they describe whole personalities, either by designating their developmental

Note that nothing in this definition refers to whether a component is conceptually adequate or not. Part of evaluating the conceptual adequacy of a component involves how well it fits with other components, as noted earlier. Because such an evaluation cannot be accomplished until components are collected together, considerations of whether a component is adequately conceptualized would be premature at this time.

### **An Initial, Perspective-by-Perspective Classification of Personality Components**

Having defined personality components, it is now possible to collect together a set of components commonly employed in personality psychology. These components will be organized initially within the given theoretical perspectives from which they emerged.

#### *Selection of theoretical perspectives*

Nine theoretical perspectives were employed in the initial classification of components: (a) cognitive/information processing, (b) dispositions and traits, (c) emotions, (d) humanistic/phenomenological, (e) learning/behavioral, (f) object relations/ego psychology, (g) psychoanalytic/psychodynamic/analytical, (h) social cognitive, and (i) other. Seven of these nine were selected from perspectives that had appeared two or more times as chapter or section headings across a set of authoritative textbooks (Hall & Lindzey, 1978; Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992; McAdams, 1990; Mischel, 1993; Pervin, 1993). The remaining two were an "emotions" perspective that incorporated textbook materials

---

stage, or by designating them as types. The anal stage is not a component, because it describes a developmental level of an entire personality. (Note, however, that anality is a component, because it describes a regressed or fixated part of a personality.) Types of personalities are also not considered components because these describe whole personality. Therefore, the self-actualized, or mesomorphs, or melancholics (in Hippocrates' sense) describe whole personalities, and do not qualify as components.

This extended definition was used in a rating scheme that included ratings for (a) components and classes of components, versus (b) noncomponent personality-related terms (i.e., organizing principles, developmental stages, and personality types), (c) developmental concepts, (d) general labels and terms (e.g., psychodynamic theory), (e) research-related terms (e.g., research concepts, research instruments, and research techniques), (f) change and therapy-related processes, and (g) other (e.g., acronyms).

specifically on love, aggression, and so forth, and an "other" category, to contain miscellaneous components.

### *Selection of components within each perspective*

Components from within each of the above nine perspectives were first collected from the glossaries of personality textbooks. Such textbook glossaries were employed because they include those components that are judged to be of sufficient importance to be passed from one generation of personologists to the next. Hjelle and Ziegler's (1992) textbook glossary was employed first, both because it is relatively extensive and because it is arranged according to theoretical perspectives similar to those employed here. Afterward, terms from two additional textbook glossaries were checked against the initial list to ensure there were no omissions of major components; these latter two glossaries (McAdams, 1990; Pervin, 1993) were chosen because they employed approaches to personality that were different from Hjelle and Ziegler's, as well as from each other.<sup>3</sup> I also added certain components that are commonly

3. Hjelle and Ziegler's textbook represents the most classical approach to the theoretical perspectives; Pervin's textbook emphasizes relatively more contemporary research and related concepts that have grown out of traditional theoretical perspectives; McAdams's textbook employs a nonperspective, fourfold framework, that corresponds to four ways of understanding the meaning of a person's life (see his preface). Cross-checking entries across glossaries caught a few unique components that were not included in the original list. Most of the time, however, components within the two supplemental glossaries were often very similar to those listed in the first. Certain components were excluded on the following bases: (a) When two glossaries employed different terms used by the same theorist for the same construct (e.g., life instinct rather than sex instinct, or self-actualizing tendency rather than actualizing tendency), one of these near-duplicates was excluded from the list; and (b) exclusions occurred when a class of concepts was extremely heavily represented, such as was the case with the self. For example, Hjelle and Ziegler listed 14 components that begin with "self" or "self-"; Pervin included 14 such components and McAdams included 12 more; note that these do not include terms that end with self (e.g., bodily self) or use Greek or Latin terms for the self or related to the self (i.e., ego, proprium). Of course, some of these terms were identical. Even among those that were a bit different, it seemed as if a judicious selection of about 18 or so of the most commonly used, and the most unique, could represent the category. Similarly, not all types of personal constructs were included. A few components (c) were excluded to reduce information overload in Table 1 if they were similar but less commonly employed than other already included components (e.g., Adler's inferiority complex was included, but not inferiority feelings). Finally, (d) certain components with the same name were excluded if they repeatedly employed similar definitions (e.g., anxiety). In all, most terms were represented either by name

referred to by personality psychologists but that do not regularly appear within such glossaries because they originate from another area of psychology (e.g., cognitive concepts, such as working memory). Finally, a few additional components were added to the table directly from primary source materials because they represented particular types of components that would otherwise be missing or because they were familiar but overlooked by all three glossaries.

As components were collected in the above ways, primary source materials were identified that introduced and/or described each component. Thus, Freud's (1923/1960) *The Ego and the Id* was identified as a primary reference for his id, ego, and superego components. The references for a given component were limited to one or two in order to fit them in the finished table (described below), although this had the regrettable consequence of omitting many psychologists who contributed substantially to each concept.

Finally, some components within a given perspective were arranged in sets proposed by the original theorist (e.g., id/ego/superego) to add comprehensibility and meaning over what would exist from a simple alphabetical compilation. Certain lengthy sets of closely related components were designated by category name where possible, and followed with a few examples (e.g., defense mechanisms, i.e., projection, denial, repression, etc.). Also, the disposition/trait section was divided into two parts to separate classes of traits (e.g., dispositional) from specific traits (e.g., extraversion). These steps led to the completed list, which was then arranged in Table 1, described below.

#### *A perspective-by-perspective classification of components (Table 1)*

Table 1 presents the perspective-by-perspective collection of components described above. Each of the nine theoretical perspectives appears as a heading, ordered alphabetically. Underneath each heading are the various components and component groups commonly associated with that perspective, followed by references that introduce and/or describe the component(s). The right-hand column of Table 1 is discussed in a later portion of this article.

The roughly 400 personality components<sup>4</sup> in Table 1 are those most

---

or by way of a class of similar components (e.g., 95% of the psychodynamic terms were represented within the psychodynamic section; slightly less in others).

4. There are close to 390 components in Table 1, counting bipolar personality dimensions as representing two components each, and counting the synonyms that appear in the notes to the psychodynamic and humanistic sections.

frequently employed in the field. Nearly everything is there from Cattell and Warburton's (1967) ergs (fundamental psychic energy), to Christie and Geis's (1970) Machiavellianism, to Freud's (1940/1949) oedipal complex. Table 1 also reveals some important facts about the components. As suggested earlier, although separated by theory, some components are obviously similar. For example, Freud's (1923/1960) partially conscious ego and Jung's (1921/1923) conscious ego, Erikson's (1963) ego-identity, Allport's (1937) ego-objectification, and the social cognitive psychologist's actual self are all related and for that reason it would make sense to treat them together, but they are infrequently compared. Also, various theories appear potentially incomplete. For example, psychodynamic theories lack humanistic/phenomenological concepts of "flow," cognitive theories fail to address facial expressions, and social cognition misses the trait concepts of "well-being." But these repetitions and omissions are hard to see in Table 1. For that reason, a reclassification would be useful.

Suggestions for such a reclassification appear within the individual perspectives themselves. For example, Freud suggested that personality could be divided into the id, the ego, and the superego. More contemporary trait theorists have suggested that much of personality can be described by sets of traits, such as the five factors of the Big Five. But these suggestions don't seem to cross theoretical boundaries very well. One cannot apply the id/ego/superego division of mind in such a way that will adequately classify the five-factor trait model; nor is there any advantage to starting with the five-factor model and trying it in reverse. Rather, it will be necessary to look for divisions of personality components that are implicitly acknowledged by theorists and researchers from most or all the above perspectives.<sup>5</sup> Many such divisions or distinctions have been described already in the Basic Issues section. Those

5. Andras Angyal, an early systems theorist, said that personality psychologists would need to find such fundamental divisions or articulations before they were able to correctly divide personality up. Angyal (1941, pp. 12–13) noted that certain ways of dividing a system were much better than others. He gave the example that buildings could be divided randomly, which would result in fragments, or according to previously fixed principles, which would result in such parts as "one-inch cubes," or according to abstractions which would result in properties of the building such as its color and size. Or

[o]ne can divide the whole *according to its structural articulation*. . . . The parts which will be obtained by such division are real holistic units. Such is, for example, the division of a building into corridors, rooms, windows, and doors. (Angyal, 1941,

**Table 1**  
**Representative Personality Components Generated by Several Theoretical Perspectives on Personality**

| Component(s) (reference)  | Relational classification  |
|---|--|
| <i>Cognitive/perceptual components</i>  |  |
| Attention (Treisman, 1964)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Current concerns (Klinger, 1977, p. 37)   | Self establishment   |
| Episodic/semantic memory systems (Tulving, 1972)  | Cognitive enablers   |
| Encoding (Tulving & Thomson, 1973)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Expert knowledge (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988)  | World establishment  |
| Feature detectors (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Field (in)dependence (Witkin et al., 1962)  | Cognitive world theme  |
| Goals (as structures) (Schank & Abelson, 1977, chap. 5)   | Cognitive enabler  |
| Implicit personality theory (Bruner & Taguiri, 1954)  | World establishment  |
| Introspection (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977)  | Conscious enabler  |
| Mood-congruent/mood-state-dependent memory process (Bower, 1981)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Mental models (as structure) (Pylyshyn, 1984)   | Cognitive enabler  |
| Pattern recognition (Grossberg & Wyse, 1991)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Perceptual defense (Bruner & Postman, 1947)   | Self establishment   |
| Procedural knowledge (as structure) (Anderson, 1983, chap. 6)   | Cognitive enabler  |
| Prototype (as structure) (Rosch & Mervis, 1975)   | Cognitive enabler  |
| Rehearsal (Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Schema (as structure) (Bartlett, 1932)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Scripts (as structure) (Schank & Abelson, 1977, chap. 3)  | Cognitive enabler  |
| Short-/long-term memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968)   | Cognitive enabler  |
| Spreading activation/mood activation (Bower, 1981)  | Cognitive enablers   |
| Unconscious proper (Kihlstrom, 1990)  | Agency   |
| Working memory (Baddeley, 1986)   | Cognitive enabler  |
| <br><i>Dispositional/trait components</i>   |  |
| <i>(Note: This first section excludes traits; for traits, see second note in this section)</i>  |  |
| Ability/temperamental/dynamic traits (Cattell & Warburton, 1967, p. 10)   | Supplementary classification   |
| Cardinal/central/secondary traits (Allport, 1937, pp. 337–338)  | Supplementary classification   |
| Genotypical/phenotypical/pseudodispositions (Allport, 1961, pp. 364–365)  | Supplementary classification   |
| Erg (Cattell & Warburton, 1967, p. 128)   | Conative enabler   |
| Factors (Spearman, 1904; Thurstone, 1947)   | Supplementary classification   |
| Needs (Murray, 1938, pp. 144–145)   | Conative enablers  |
| Propriate striving (Allport, 1961, pp. 126–127)   | Conative self theme  |
| Proprium (Allport, 1961, p. 127)  | Self establishment   |
| Self-extension/-image/-objectification (Allport, 1937, pp. 213–214)   | Self establishments  |
| Self-esteem/-identity (Allport, 1961, pp. 114–120)  | Self establishments  |
| Source/surface traits (Cattell, 1965, pp. 374–375)  | Supplementary classification   |
| States/traits (Cattell, 1965, chap. 6)  | Supplementary classification   |
| Supertraits (Superfactors) (Eysenck, 1982, pp. 7, 87)   | Supplementary classification   |
| <br><i>(Note: This section includes individual needs and traits; groups of traits appear under Big Five, Needs, and Sixteen PF)</i>   |  |
| Absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974)  | Conscious self theme   |
| Acquiescence (Couch & Keniston, 1960)   | Conative self-in-world theme   |
| Authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950)  | Conative world theme   |
| Big Five (Extraversion-Introversion/Friendliness-Hostility/Neuroticism-Stability/Open-Closedness/Conscientious-Careless) (Goldberg, 1993; McCrae & Costa, 1985; Norman, 1963) | Affective self-in-world/affective self/<br>cognitive self-in-world/conative self-<br>in-world themes |
| Ego strength (Block & Block, 1980)  | Affective self theme   |
| Empathy (as trait) (Davis, 1983; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972)   | Affective world theme  |
| Intelligence (Galton, 1883; Wechsler, 1981)   | Cognitive world theme  |



**Table 1**  
Continued

| Component(s) (reference)   | Relational classification  |
|--|--|
| Interpersonal circle (Leary, 1957; Wiggins, 1979)  | Supplementary classification   |
| Intrinsic intellectuality (Lloyd & Barenblatt, 1984)   | Cognitive self theme   |
| Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970)   | Conative self-in-world theme   |
| Masculinity/femininity/androgyny (as traits) (Bem, 1974)   | Conative self-in-world themes  |
| Need or <i>n</i> Abasement/Achievement/Affiliation/Aggression/Autonomy/Counteraction/Deference/Defendance/Dominance/Exhibition/Harmavoidance/Infavoidance/Nurturance/Order/Play/Rejection/Sentience/Sex/Succorance/Superiority/Understanding (Murray, 1938, pp. 144–145) | Conative enablers  |
| Need or <i>n</i> Achievement/Affiliation/Power (McClelland, 1984b, chap. 16)   | Conative self-in-world themes  |
| Narcissism (as trait) (Emmons, 1987)   | Conative self-in-world theme   |
| Neuroticism-stability/extraversion-introversion/tough-tender mindedness (Eysenck, 1990)  | Affective self/affective self-in-world/<br>affective self-in-world themes  |
| Private/public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975)  | Conscious self/conscious self-in-world<br>themes   |
| Shyness (Cheek & Buss, 1981)   | Conscious self-in-world theme  |
| Self-esteem (Fitts, 1964–1965)   | Affective self theme   |
| Self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974)   | Conscious self theme   |
| Sensation-seeking (Zuckerman, 1979)  | Conative self theme  |
| (Sixteen PF) Affectothymia/Intelligence/Ego-Strength/Dominance/Surgency/Superego-Strength/Adventurous/Tender-Mindedness/Suspiciousness/Non-Conformity/Shrewdness/Guilt-Proneness . . . (Cattell, 1965, chaps. 3, 4)  | Affective self/cognitive world/affective<br>self/conative self-in-world/affective<br>self/conative self-in-world/conative<br>self-in-world/affective self-in-world/<br><br>affective self-in-world/conative self-in-<br>world/cognitive self-in-world/affective<br>self themes |
| Social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1953)  | Conative self-in-world theme   |
| Well-being (as trait) (Diener, 1984)   | Affective self-in-world theme  |
| <i>Emotion and emotion-related components</i>  |  |
| Duchenne smile (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990)  | Affective enabler  |
| Emotion-focused/problem-focused coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)   | Self/world establishment   |
| Emotional experience (deRivera, 1977)  | Affective enabler  |
| Emotion/sentiment (McDougall, 1923)  | Affective enabler/self-in-world establish-<br>ment   |
| Emotional facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Tomkins, 1962)  | Affective enablers   |
| Happiness, surprise, anger, fear, sadness, disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1971)   | Affective enablers   |
| Joy, acceptance, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation (Plutchik, 1980)  | Affective enablers   |
| Pleasant-unpleasant/arousal-calm (Russell, 1979)   | Affective self themes  |
| Preferences (Zajonc, 1980)   | Self-in-world establishments   |
| Primary/secondary appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)  | Affective enabler/self-in-world establish-<br>ment   |
| Scripts/nuclear scenes (Tomkins, 1979)   | Self establishments  |
| <i>Humanistic/phenomenological components</i>  |  |
| (Note: For alienation, see isolation; for distortion, see perceptual distortion; for genuineness, see congruence; for Maslow's needs, see physiological)   |  |
| Actual/ideal self (Rogers, 1989, pp. 241–243)  | Self establishment   |
| Actualizing tendency (Rogers, 1961, pp. 350–351)   | Conative enabler   |
| B(eing)-love/d(eficiency)-love (Maslow, 1968, chap. 3)   | Conative enablers  |

**Table 1**  
Continued

| Component(s) (reference)  | Relational classification                    |
|---|--|
| Creativity (as trait) (Rogers, 1961, pp. 347–359)   | Cognitive world theme                        |
| Congruence/incongruence (Rogers, 1989, pp. 222–224)   | Self-in-world establishments                 |
| Dasein (being in world) (Boss, 1963, chap. 2)   | Conscious enabler                            |
| Eigenwelt/umwelt/mitwelt (as traits) (May, 1958, pp. 61–65)   | Conscious self/self-in-world/world themes    |
| Depersonalization (von Gebattel, 1958, pp. 180–181)   | Conscious self theme                         |
| Empathy (as structure) (Rogers, 1961, p. 284)   | World establishment                          |
| Experiential field (Rogers, 1951, chap. 11, I–II)   | Conscious enabler                            |
| Flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, pp. 39–41)  | Conscious world theme                        |
| Gemeinschaftsgefühl (Maslow, 1970, p. 165)  | Affective world theme                        |
| Growth motive (Maslow, 1968, chap. 3)   | Conative enabler                             |
| Instinctoid need (Maslow, 1968, pp. 190–191)  | Conative enabler                             |
| Internal frame of reference (Rogers, 1951, chap. 11, VII)   | World establishment                          |
| Isolation (Bakan, 1966)   | Conative self-in-world theme                 |
| Jonah complex (Maslow, 1971, pp. 34–39)   | Self-in-world establishment                  |
| Meta-need (Maslow, 1970, p. 134)  | Self establishment                           |
| Need for positive regard/self-regard (Rogers, 1989, pp. 245–246)  | Conative enablers                            |
| Openness/defensiveness (as structures) (Rogers, 1961, pp. 115–117)  | Self establishments                          |
| Pedantry (Binswanger, 1972)   | Cognitive self-in-world theme                |
| Physiological/safety/love/esteem/self-actualization needs (Maslow, 1970, chap. 4)   | Conative enablers                            |
| Peak experience (Maslow, 1968, chap. 6)   | Self establishment                           |
| Perceptual distortion (elsewhere, distortion) (Rogers, 1951, chap. 11, XI)  | Self establishment                           |
| Self-actualization tendency (Maslow, 1968, pp. 25–26)   | Conative enabler                             |
| Self-concept (Rogers, 1961, pp. 256–258)  | Self establishment                           |
| Subception (Rogers, 1989, p. 248)   | Self establishment                           |
| Threat (to self-structure) (Rogers, 1989, p. 287)   | Affective enabler                            |
| Unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1989, p. 224)  | World establishment                          |
| <i>Learning/behavioral components</i>   |  |
| <i>(Note: Behavioral components were reformulated so as to include internal action planning; this permitted their inclusion here)</i>   |  |
| Approach-avoidance related conflicts (Dollard & Miller, 1950, chap. 22)   | Self-in-world establishments                 |
| Conditioned emotional reaction (Watson & Rayner, 1920)  | Self-in-world establishment                  |
| Conditioned/unconditioned response (Skinner, 1974, pp. 38–39)   | Self-in-world establishment/conative enabler |
| Emitted behavior (Skinner, 1938, p. 430)  | Conative enabler                             |
| Habits (Hull, 1943, chap. 9)  | Self-in-world establishment                  |
| Instinctive behavior (Skinner, 1974, pp. 34–35)   | Conative enabler                             |
| Operant/respondent behavior (Skinner, 1938, pp. 20, 40)   | Conative enabler/world establishment         |
| Primary/secondary drive (Hull, 1943, chaps. 6, 7)   | Conative enabler/self-in-world establishment |
| <i>Object Relations, ego, individual psychology components</i>  |  |
| <i>(Note: For Erikson's trust-mistrust, industry-inferiority, etc., see developmental stage characteristics)</i>  |  |
| Basic anxiety/hostility (Horney, 1937, pp. 79–89)   | Affective enablers                           |
| Character neurosis (Horney, 1937, pp. 30–31)  | Agency                                       |
| Daydreaming (Singer, 1966)  | Self establishment                           |
| Developmental stage characteristics (e.g., trust-mistrust, autonomy-shame, initiative-guilt, industry-inferiority, identity-role confusion, intimacy-isolation, generativity-stagnation, wisdom-despair) (Erikson, 1963, chap. 7) | Self-in-world establishments                 |

**Table 1**  
Continued

| Component(s) (reference)  | Relational classification                      |
|---|--|
| Ego-identity (Erikson, 1963, chap. 7)   | Self establishment                             |
| Ego-integrity (Erikson, 1963, chap. 7)  | Self establishment                             |
| Identity (role) diffusion (crisis) (Erikson, 1963, chap. 7)   | Self establishment                             |
| Identity achievement/moratorium/foreclosure/diffusion (Marcia, 1966)  | Self establishments                            |
| Inferiority complex (Adler, 1964, chap. 6)  | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| Moving away/against/toward people (Horney, 1945, chap. 2)   | Self-in-world establishments                   |
| Need(s) for identity/relatedness/rootedness/transcendence/frame of orientation (Fromm, 1955, chap. 3)   | Self-in-world establishments                   |
| Organ inferiority (Adler, 1964, pp. 79–80)  | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| Overcompensation (Adler, 1964, chap. 7)   | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| Psychosocial strengths (e.g., hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, wisdom) (Erikson, 1982, p. 33)   | Self-in-world establishments                   |
| Self-object introject (Kohut, 1971)   | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| Self system (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 19–29)   | Self establishment                             |
| Social interest (Adler, 1964, p. 275)   | Conative world theme                           |
| Striving for superiority/will to power (Adler, 1964, chap. 7)   | Conative enablers                              |
| Style of life (Adler, 1964, chap. 2)  | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| Superiority complex (Adler, 1964, chap. 7)  | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| <i>Psychoanalytic, psychodynamic, and analytical components</i>   |  |
| (Note: For anxiety, see moral anxiety; for ego, etc., see id; for eros/thanatos, or sexual/aggressive instincts, see life/death instincts; for repression, denial, etc., see defense mechanisms; for secondary revision, symbolization, etc., see dream-work) |  |
| Anima/animus (Jung, 1945/1953, pp. 198–223)   | World establishments                           |
| Archetype (Jung, 1943/1953, pp. 100–123)  | World establishment                            |
| Cathexis/anticathexis/catharsis (Freud, 1920/1950, pp. 31–38)   | Conative enablers                              |
| Conscious/preconscious/unconscious (Freud, 1900/1965, chap. 7)  | Conscious enabler/agencies                     |
| Defense mechanisms (e.g., denial, intellectualization, isolation, reaction formation, repression, suppression) (A. Freud, 1937/1966)  | Self establishments                            |
| Dreamwork (e.g., condensation, displacement, symbolization, secondary revision) (Freud, 1900/1965, chap. 6)   | Cognitive enablers                             |
| Ego-ideal/conscience (Freud, 1923/1960, chap. 3, pp. 25–27)   | Self-in-world establishments                   |
| Enantiodromia (Jung, 1923, pp. 541–542)   | Cognitive enabler                              |
| Fixation (Freud, 1917/1966, chap. 22, p. 340)   | Self establishment                             |
| Frustration (as status of impeded drives) (Freud, 1917/1966, pp. 344–345)   | Affective enabler                              |
| Functions (feeling, intuiting, sensing, thinking) (Jung, 1923, chap. 10)  | Cognitive enablers                             |
| Id/ego/superego (Freud, 1923/1960, chaps. 2, 3)   | Agencies                                       |
| Identification (Freud, 1923/1960, pp. 18–24)  | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| Libido (Freud, 1940/1949, pp. 6–8)  | Conative enabler                               |
| Life/death instincts (Freud, 1923/1960, chap. 4)  | Conative enablers                              |
| Moral/neurotic/realistic anxiety (Freud, 1926/1959, pp. 71–72, 91–93)   | Self-in-world establishments/affective enabler |
| Oedipus/Electra complex (Freud, 1940/1949, p. 51)   | World establishments                           |
| Penis envy (Freud, 1933/1965, pp. 125–135)  | Self-in-world establishment                    |
| Persona (Jung, 1945/1953, pp. 166–172)  | World establishment                            |
| Personal/collective unconscious (Jung, 1945/1953, pp. 136–147)  | Agencies                                       |
| Pleasure/reality principles (Freud, 1920/1950, pp. 1–7)   | Conative enabler/self-in-world establishment   |
| Primary/secondary processes (Freud, 1900/1965, chap. 7)   | Cognitive enablers                             |

**Table 1**  
Continued

| Component(s) (reference)   | Relational classification     |
|--|-------------------------------|
| Self/shadow/ego (Jung, 1921/1923, p. 540)                                    | Self establishments           |
| Subliminal psychodynamic activation (Silverman, 1976)                        | Cognitive enabler             |
| Transference (Freud, 1917/1966, chap. 27)                                    | Cognitive enablers            |
| Womb envy (Yorburg, 1974)  | Self-in-world establishment   |
| <i>Social-cognitive components</i>   |                               |
| Actual/ideal/ought self (Higgins, 1987)                                      | Self establishments           |
| Anticipated consequences (Bandura, 1977, pp. 166–167)                        | World establishments          |
| Attentional processes (Bandura, 1977, p. 24)                                 | Conscious enablers            |
| Behavioral competencies/deficits (Bandura, 1969, p. 5)                       | Conative enablers             |
| Causal attributions (Weiner, 1990)   | World establishments          |
| Circumspection-preemption control cycle (Kelly, 1955, pp. 514–517)           | Cognitive enabler             |
| Expectancy (Rotter, 1954, p. 107)  | World establishment           |
| Face (Goffman, 1967, chap. 1)  | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Freedom of movement (Rotter, 1954, p. 194)                                   | Cognitive world theme         |
| Gender identity (Bem, 1974)  | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Generalized expectancy (Rotter, 1954, pp. 120–122)                           | World establishment           |
| Imaginal/verbal representation processes (Bandura, 1977, pp. 25–26)          | Cognitive enablers            |
| Internal-external control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1975)                    | Cognitive self-in-world theme |
| Learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975)  | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Life story identity (McAdams, 1987)  | Self establishment            |
| Locus of control (Rotter, 1975)  | Cognitive world theme         |
| Minimal goal level (Rotter, 1954, p. 213)                                    | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Modeling (Bandura, 1977, pp. 40–44)  | Cognitive enabler             |
| Motor reproduction processes (Bandura, 1977, pp. 27–28)                      | Conative enabler              |
| Need potential/value (Rotter, 1954, chap. 6)                                 | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Permeable vs. impermeable constructs (Kelly, 1955, pp. 79–82)                | Supplemental classification   |
| Personal constructs (Kelly, 1955, chap. 2)                                   | World establishments          |
| Personal projects (Palys & Little, 1983)                                     | Self-in-world establishments  |
| Personal strivings (Emmons, 1986)  | Self-in-world establishments  |
| Personality prototypes (Cantor & Mischel, 1977)                              | World establishment           |
| Possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986)                                      | Self establishments           |
| Preemptive/constellatory/propositional constructs (Kelly, 1955, pp. 153–155) | Supplemental classification   |
| Psychological situation (Rotter, 1954, pp. 200–201)                          | World establishment           |
| Reinforcement value (Rotter, 1954, p. 107)                                   | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Role playing (Hogan, 1983)   | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, p. 79)   | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Self-schemata (Markus, 1977)   | Self establishment            |
| Self-regulation (Bandura, 1977, pp. 200–213)                                 | Self establishment            |
| Self-reinforcement (Bandura, 1977, pp. 130–133)                              | Self establishment            |
| Significant other schemata (Anderson & Cole, 1990)                           | World establishment           |
| Totalitarian ego (Greenwald, 1980)   | Agency                        |
| <i>Other components</i>  |                               |
| Attention/awareness/energy (Tart, 1975)                                      | Conscious enablers            |
| Automatization/deautomatization (Deikman, 1966; Wolman & Ullman, 1986)       | Conscious enablers            |
| Canalization (Murphy, 1947, p. 162)  | Conative enabler              |
| Consciousness (Ornstein, 1986; Tart, 1975)                                   | Conscious enabler             |
| Curiosity (Wechsler, 1974)   | Conative world theme          |
| Ethical/moral judgment structures (Kohlberg, 1973)                           | Self-in-world establishment   |

**Table 1**  
**Continued**

| Component(s) (reference)  | Relational classification     |
|---|-------------------------------|
| Feminine social/masculine occupational clock (Helson et al., 1984)    | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Life themes (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, pp. 230–240)                     | Self-in-world establishment   |
| Personal intelligence (Gardner, 1983, p. 239)                         | Cognitive self theme          |
| Private personality (Singer, 1984)                                    | Agency                        |
| Self-awareness (Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990, pp. 160–161)               | Cognitive self theme          |
| Self (as knower)/self (as known) (James, 1892, chap. 12)              | Agency, self establishment    |
| Stream of thought/of subjective life (James, 1892, chap. 11, p. 159)  | Conscious enabler             |
| Substantive/transitive resting places (James, 1892, chap. 11, p. 160) | Conscious enablers            |
| Social intelligence (Thorndike, 1936)                                 | Cognitive self-in-world theme |

distinctions will be employed as the basis of the relational classification system to be described in the next section.

### **A Relational Classification System**

As stated earlier, personality components can be classified under a number of dimensions, such as whether a component has a dedicated or incidental function, is a mechanism or a feature collection, lower- or upper-level, and so on. An examination of Table 1 suggests that by using such distinctions it may be possible to classify components into more universal types. The present system uses such dimensions to classify components into four broad types and their subtypes. The formal description of this typology will list features that define each of its four types and its further subtypes; such lists will be presented shortly. But a more intuitive overview of the classification system is presented first because it has the advantage of quickly conveying the central ideas of the system.

#### *Overview of the relational classification system*

An overview of the present system can be gained from reference to certain examples of the four types of components drawn from Table 1. For example, many theorists appear to have proposed components that perform basic and universal functions at a lower psychological level. These components are called enablers in the present system. Enablers include such components as memory networks, instinctoid needs, and verbal representational processes. Further examples of enablers, drawn from Table 1, have been recopied into the second column of Table 2. Table 2 arranges these enablers by their theory of origin, indicating that all major personality perspectives have proposed such entities. The term enablers derives from a contraction of the term enabling mechanism employed by Averill (1992) to designate a similar but somewhat differently defined class of personality components. Enablers can be further subdivided according to whether they address functions related to cognition, affect, or conation (cf. Hilgard, 1980), or consciousness, which also seems to fit the enabler prototype.

Many theorists go on to discuss a second type of component that is constructed by the individual in order to develop and maintain complex representations of his or her self and the world. These components are here termed establishments. Establishments include such components

**Table 2**  
**Four Types of Personality Components that Reappear across Multiple Psychological Perspectives**

| Theoretical perspective | Component type                  |                      |                     |                     |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                         | Enablers                        | Establishments       | Themes              | Agency              |
| Cognitive               | Memory network                  | Expert knowledge     | Field dependence    | Unconscious proper  |
| Dispositional           | <i>n</i> Aggression             | Self-extension       | Affectothymia       | —                   |
| Emotional               | Emotion                         | Sentiment            | Pleasantness        | —                   |
| Humanistic              | Instinctoid need                | Self-concept         | Gemeinschaftsgefühl | —                   |
| Learning                | Unconditioned response          | Conditioned response | —                   | —                   |
| Object relations        | Basic anxiety                   | Industry             | Social interest     | Character neurosis  |
| Psychodynamic           | Sexual instinct                 | Conscience           | Neurotic anxiety    | Ego                 |
| Social                  | Verbal representational process | Self-regulation      | Locus of control    | Totalitarian ego    |
| Other                   | Consciousness                   | Life themes          | Social intelligence | Private personality |

as expert knowledge, self-esteem, and the conscience, and also appear universally across theoretical perspectives, as can be seen in Column 3 of Table 2. The term establishment was used by Murray and Kluckhohn (1956) to describe a complex mental representation that is constructed in the course of personality development. These components exist at a higher level than enablers in that they employ enablers such as memory networks and emotions in their representational tasks. Establishments can be classified according to their contents because this representational function is such a central part of what they do. In the present system, establishments are subdivided into those that model the self, the world, and the self-in-the-world.

The third type of component is the theme, which is named to denote a characteristic pattern of thought, feeling, and/or motivation that is constructed or emerges from an interaction among enablers and establishments. A theme is formed when related features of enablers and establishments are defined as a group, either because they have emerged from interactions with one another, or solely according to some quality they share in common according to an external criterion. For example, extraversion might arise from features including a motivation for stimulation, a rich knowledge of other people, and generally positive affect. Other themes include field dependence, affectothymia, and locus of control, and have been proposed within almost all the theoretical perspectives examined here, as illustrated in Column 4 of Table 2.

Because themes abstract features from both enablers and establishments, they can be classified on the basis of the primary enabler and establishment upon which they draw. For example, when consciousness is combined with the self it results in themes describing inner-directed states of consciousness such as inner awareness and private self-consciousness. This approach to classification is similar in many ways to one proposed by Buss and Finn (1987), who, for example, categorized shyness as involving affect and the self.

The fourth and final type of component is the agency, named so as to indicate both that it represents a central division of personality, and also that it may appropriate to itself significant functions of the whole personality. Such agencies are sometimes regarded as co- or subpersonalities in the sense that they may direct a person's actions.<sup>6</sup> The term

6. The term agency also connotes an internal entity that causes things to happen. Many theorists explicitly included such a possible meaning when describing components here classified as agencies. For example, James's self as knower explicitly included the possibility that it was a causal agent independent of the rest of personality. Similarly,



**Figure 1**  
**A Simplified Relational Table of Personality Components**


*ESTABLISHMENTS*

*THEMES*

|   |                                   |  |                                   |  |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| <i>WORLD</i>  | CONSCIOUS<br><i>WORLD</i>         | COGNITIVE<br><i>WORLD</i>  | AFFECTIVE<br><i>WORLD</i>         | CONATIVE<br><i>WORLD</i>   |
| <i>SELF-IN-WORLD</i><br>EXAMPLE: An <u>ethical system</u> is developed out of a drive for social approval, and is then stored within long-term memory.  | CONSCIOUS<br><i>SELF-IN-WORLD</i> | COGNITIVE<br><i>SELF-IN-WORLD</i>  | AFFECTIVE<br><i>SELF-IN-WORLD</i> | CONATIVE<br><i>SELF-IN-WORLD</i><br>EXAMPLE: <u>Conscientiousness</u> emerges from a drive for social approval and an ethical system that makes honoring commitments a priority. |
| <i>SELF</i>   | CONSCIOUS<br><i>SELF</i>          | COGNITIVE<br><i>SELF</i>   | AFFECTIVE<br><i>SELF</i>          | CONATIVE<br><i>SELF</i>  |
| EXAMPLE: The <u>superego</u> consists of an ethical system, the ego-ideal, conative themes such as conscientiousness, and underlying memory, affective, and conative processes related to developing ethical behaviors. | CONSCIOUS                         | COGNITIVE<br>EXAMPLE: <u>Long-term memory</u> structures and processes store ethical and other concepts, while remaining partially distinct from them. | AFFECTIVE                         | CONATIVE<br>EXAMPLE: A <u>drive for social approval</u> motivates the development of an ethical system while remaining partially distinct from it.                               |

*AGENCIES*

*ENABLERS*



Note. The four types of components (enablers, establishments, themes, and agencies) are arranged around the four corners of the figure. The four subtypes of enablers appear in the lower right corner. The three subtypes of establishments appear in the upper left corner. An arrow extends from the enablers to the establishments to indicate that the enablers support the establishments. The 12 themes are arranged in a 3 × 4 grid in the upper right corner so that each theme is in the column of the enabler and the row of the establishment to which it is most related. The bottom left portion of the figure includes an agency. Examples of specific components appear within a few of the boxes; these examples collectively depict a simplified version of an ethical system or superego.

agency has been used in translations of Freud to refer to such components as the id and ego (e.g., Freud, 1923/1960, p. 7). Agencies are complex composites of the first three component types that span large portions of personality (i.e., that include large numbers of enablers, establishments, and themes). Examples include a person's private personality and the ego. Agencies have been proposed in a few but not all of the different perspectives, as noted in Column 5 of Table 2. Because they are relatively fewer in number than components of the first three types, they are not further subdivided within this system.

An overview of the four types of components and their subtypes is illustrated in Figure 1. With one exception, each of the 20 boxes in the diagram represents a single subtype of component. The four subtypes of enablers (conscious, cognitive, affective, and conative) occupy the four boxes in the bottom right of the figure. The three subtypes of establishments (self, self-in-world, world) occupy the three boxes in the upper left. The theme subtypes occupy 12 boxes, arranged in a  $3 \times 4$  grid in the upper right of the figure. Each subtype of theme is labeled according to the enabler and establishment to which it is most closely related (e.g., a conscious-self theme, or a conative self-in-world theme). Each theme box is positioned directly above its related enabler and directly to the right of its related establishment. Finally, the box representing agencies (there are no subtypes) is located in the lower left of the figure. Figure 1 also includes five examples of components depicting the simplified operation of an individual's superego or conscience. Each of the five components is classified in a different category (box) and is followed with a brief description of its involvement in the system.

Figure 1 further indicates how each of the four component types possesses qualities that are linked to its particular position and construction. For example, the lower level establishments (e.g., long-term

---

Freud's id, ego, and superego were often agentic in their depiction, taking on qualities similar to the multiple, dissociated personalities described by James, Janet, and others. The causal aspect is only one aspect of the agency, however, and therefore not the only criterion for its classification. For example, Kihlstrom's unconscious proper is classed as an agency (albeit an atypical one) because it demarcates a division of considerable size rather than because of any strong implication that it engages in concerted independent action at the unconscious level. On the other hand, Allport's proprium is "not caused by a separate agent" (Allport, 1961, p. 138) and for that reason it is classified as an establishment rather than an agency because it is nothing more than a representation of the self.

memory) provide support to higher level establishments (e. g., the ethical system), as is common in complex systems (cf. governments or computers). The qualities of these four types of components, like the specific components themselves, have arisen in part as generalizations from analogous types of components of better-understood systems. The more formal attributes of each component type are discussed below.

### **A Formal Discussion of the Four Types of Components and Their Subtypes**

*A comparison of the four component types on their features (Table 3)*

A more formal treatment of enablers, establishments, themes, and agencies appears in the four columns of Table 3. The columns are arranged in a side-by-side format to permit a convenient comparison of the types on their characteristics. Each of the four columns describes a single type of component on a number of its specific characteristics. For example, each type is first compared on its function. The enabler "performs basic psychological functions necessary to the operation of the more complex aspects of personality." The establishment "models complex aspects of the internal or external world. . . ." The theme "expresses one or more characteristics of the organism that are formed by the combined action of multiple, related personality features. . . ." The agency "performs a nearly complete set of the functions of personality itself, but in partial independence of the whole, and lacking its complex, integrated qualities. . . ." (All quotes are taken from Table 3.) The types are then compared on structure and content, location and boundaries, developmental consistency, and universality. These headings correspond to earlier sections of this article in which many of the concepts employed in Table 3 were discussed more extensively. Subclassifications and examples of each type are also included in Table 3.

Although each type is described on many dimensions, the specific underlying rationale for each description is omitted on the basis that such lengthy explanations are secondary to judging the system as a whole. Because the descriptions are of prototypes, most components will not fit a given one of the four descriptions exactly; most do, however, fit one of the four more than the others. Three of the four basic types, the enablers, establishments, and themes (but not agencies), also possess subtypes, and these are depicted in Tables 4-6, also in a

side-by-side manner. The next sections describe those tables in greater detail.

### *Tables describing subtypes*

A further understanding of enablers, establishments, and themes can be gained by examining the subtypes of each, which are arranged in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively. For example, enablers can be subdivided according to the primary functions with which they are concerned: consciousness, cognition, conation, and affect. Table 4 describes the four subtypes of enablers corresponding to these functions. For example, the conscious enabler subtype (Table 4, Column 1), is defined according to its specific function ("creates awareness, directs it, patterns it . . ."), and is followed by a more specific statement describing the inclusions and exclusions of the category ("includes . . . mechanisms underlying . . . consciousness . . . , excludes the conscious thoughts themselves"), and then is followed by examples (attention, experiential field). The same format is repeated for the remaining columns of Table 4, which concern cognitive, affective, and conative enablers.

Similarly, Table 5 describes the three subtypes of establishments: those concerning the self, self-in-world, and world, which are arranged in the three side-by-side columns there. For example, the self subtype is described by its specific function ("represents and maintains concepts of the self and its parts . . ."), its inclusions and exclusions ("includes structures with their primary focus on the self, even though these will of necessity include some information about the self-in-world . . ."), and examples ("identity, self-esteem").

Finally, Table 6 describes the twelve subtypes of themes. Its first column begins with a description of consciousness-related themes, and then goes on to consider the conscious self, self-in-world, and world subtypes individually. The next three columns describe cognitive, affective, and conative subtypes, respectively.

There is no additional table for the agencies because they were too few in number to profit from being divided into subtypes.

### *A preliminary empirical study of the classification system*

Assigning a given component to an approximate location within the classification system requires that three sorts of judgments be made

**Table 3**  
**Characteristics of the Major Component Prototypes**

| The enabler prototype   | The establishment prototype   | The theme prototype  | The agency prototype  |
|---|---|--|---|
| <p><i>Function:</i> Performs basic psychological function necessary to the operation of more complex aspects of personality.</p>  | <p><i>Function:</i> Models complex aspects of the internal or external world, as well as monitoring and sometimes suppressing (e.g., with defenses) inconsistencies within such representations.</p>  | <p><i>Function:</i> Expresses one or more characteristics of the organism that are formed by the combined action of multiple, related personality features; such expressions may sometimes evolve secondarily or incidentally.</p>   | <p><i>Function:</i> Performs a nearly complete set of the functions of personality itself, but in partial independence of the whole, and lacking its complex, integrated qualities; generally excludes some important function(s) of the whole (e.g., rationality, sociability, or consciousness).</p>  |
| <p><i>Structure and content:</i><br/>           Mechanistic structure stores and makes use of contents without itself including the content. Employs multiple smaller enablers or neurological components in performing its task.</p> | <p><i>Structure and content:</i><br/>           Content-determined structure is organized by representations and the connections among them. To produce a representation, will commonly integrate the work of multiple enablers (e.g., cognition and affect).</p> | <p><i>Structure and content:</i> Featural structure includes elements from both enablers and establishments. Features may become related through internal interactions, as when insecurities create self-consciousness. Alternatively, features may be related solely by outside criteria.</p> | <p><i>Structure and content:</i> Additive structure combines multiple enablers, establishments, and themes, which operate concurrently with one another.</p>  |
| <p><i>Location and boundaries:</i><br/>           Lower level, extending from a lower boundary at or near the psychoneurological level upward to end at the lower boundary of the psychological establishments.</p>                   | <p><i>Location and boundaries:</i><br/>           Upper level, extending from its interactions with enablers up to interactions with larger systems external to personality such as family and cultural systems.</p>  | <p><i>Location and boundaries:</i><br/>           Features are widely distributed across levels, among both enablers and establishments.</p>   | <p><i>Location and boundaries:</i><br/>           Cross-level, spanning from at or near the neurological level to interactions with outside systems such as family and cultural systems. Agencies span multiple groups of larger enablers, establishments, and (unrelated) themes. A few agencies should plausibly cover all or most of personality in healthy individuals (e.g., id/ego/superego; private/public personality).</p> |
| <p><i>Developmental consistency:</i><br/>           Often operates from birth or is developed early without (much) learning. Performs the same function in much the same way throughout the lifespan.</p>                             | <p><i>Developmental consistency:</i> May change its basic contents (and organization) during developmental stages of growth, as well as through substantial learning or educational experiences (e.g., from novice to expert knowledge).</p>                      | <p><i>Developmental consistency:</i><br/>           Possesses aspects that are both fixed (enablers) and that change (establishments).</p>   | <p><i>Developmental consistency:</i><br/>           Will vary depending upon the classes of components that make it up.</p>   |

**Table 3**  
Continued

| The enabler prototype  | The establishment prototype   | The theme prototype  | The agency prototype  |
|--|---|--|---|
| <i>Universality:</i> Universally present in normal personality, although there may be individual differences in its quality or level of functioning. | <i>Universality:</i> Larger establishments (e.g., self-concept) are present in most normal adult personalities, albeit with individual differences in content (and organization). Smaller ones may or may not be present. | <i>Universality:</i> Varies considerably from person to person and is often compared to similar themes in other people along a personality dimension. The theme's position in the continuum represents its degree of content (e.g., of sociability). | <i>Universality:</i> Most are universally present in normal personality; there also may exist abnormal agencies that are less universal (e.g., character neurosis). |
| <i>Subclassifications:</i> According to the basic functions it carries out: consciousness, cognition, affect, and conation.                          | <i>Subclassifications:</i> According to the objects it models: self, world, and self-in-world.  | <i>Subclassifications:</i> According to the location of most of its features, designated by an enabler-establishment pair (e.g., conscious-self, cognitive-world, etc.)  | <i>Subclassifications:</i> None.  |
| <i>Examples:</i> Working memory, happy mood experience.  | <i>Examples:</i> Self-concept, repression.  | <i>Examples:</i> Affectothymia, extraversion.  | <i>Examples:</i> Superego, private personality.   |

with some degree of reliability. First, judgments must be made as to whether a given component is an enabler, establishment, theme, or agency. Second, if that component is either an enabler or a theme, judgments must be made as to whether a given component mostly involves consciousness, cognition, affect, or conation. Finally, if the component is an establishment or theme, judgments must be made as to whether the component pertains to the self, self-in-world, or world.

During development of the system, two graduate students and I classified 54 personality components to ensure that such judgments could be made with some reliability. We selected the 54 components haphazardly from the glossaries of several personality textbooks and employed the glossary definitions for our ratings in order to control for our understanding of a given part. Before performing their ratings, both graduate-student raters spent several hours with me discussing the system, examining early versions of Tables 3–6 and practice-rating other components. On the basis of those early discussions, and during the editorial process, materials in the tables were further revised for clarity. Both because the extensive discussions among the raters may have either inflated or interfered with our agreement, and also because subsequent revisions further clarified the system, the following findings should be treated as suggestive only. Our agreement as to whether a given component was an enabler, establishment, theme, or agency ran between 73% and 84% (compared to 25% by chance). Our agreement as to whether a component was a conscious, cognitive, affective, or conative subtype (for pairs of enablers, pairs of themes, or enablers and themes) ranged from 75% to 87% (compared to 25% by chance). Finally, our agreement that a given component involved the self, self-in-world, or world (for pairs of establishments, pairs of themes, or establishments and themes) ranged from 70% to 78% (compared to 33% by chance). These agreement levels were all statistically significant ( $ps$  all  $< .001$ )<sup>7</sup> and meaningfully higher than chance levels. Disagreements most often occurred when a particular component appeared to be midway between two prototypes, or when two of us viewed a given component from a

7. The null hypothesis assumed that raters would allocate their choices evenly and independently across possible alternatives in the absence of any meaningful classificatory guidance. The binomial distribution was employed to assess the likelihood of agreements, e.g., in the 4 category case,  $p(\text{agreement}) = .25$ ,  $q(\text{disagreement}) = .75$ ,  $N = 54$ . Significance levels for certain tests were extrapolated from standard tables based on the fact that 7/10  $N$  positive instances (our lowest level of agreement) always exceed statistical significance starting at  $N = 20$ .

**Table 4**  
**Characteristics of the Enabler Subtypes**

| The conscious enabler subtype  | The cognitive enabler subtype  | The affective enabler subtype  | The conative enabler subtype  |
|--|--|--|---|
| <p><i>Specific function:</i> Creates awareness, directs it, patterns it, or otherwise contributes to its function.</p>   | <p><i>Specific function:</i> Permits perception, memory, reasoning, etc., and generally “knowing” about the world. Includes structures that may form or represent the contents of thought.</p>   | <p><i>Specific function:</i> Constructs specific or general classes of feelings, such as emotions and moods, sleep, and other such internal sensations; often affects biochemistry, physiology, facial expressions, internal phenomenology, etc.</p> | <p><i>Specific function:</i> Constructs specific desires, needs, urges, intended or planned behaviors, and competencies to perform behavior.</p>  |
| <p><i>Inclusions and exclusions:</i> Includes both the mechanisms underlying the contents of consciousness and the structures that may form or contain the contents, but excludes the conscious thoughts themselves.</p> | <p><i>Inclusions and exclusions:</i> Although it makes use of acquired knowledge to perform functions, as when concepts in long-term memory are used to identify a perceived object, such acquired concepts are not part of the enabler.</p> | <p><i>Inclusions and exclusions:</i> Includes basic emotional reactions such as love in response to a generally harmonious environment, but excludes learned emotional reactions to specific objects (i.e., anxiety over health).</p>                | <p><i>Inclusions and exclusions:</i> Includes the internal control of behaviors. So, operant behavior should be considered a conative enabler, even though behavior analysts would view it from an external perspective; reinforcement contingencies, etc., should still be considered noncomponents.</p> |
| <p><i>Examples:</i> Attention, experiential field, and the stream of thoughts (but not the thoughts themselves).</p>   | <p><i>Examples:</i> Feature detectors, episodic memory, and schemata (but not the contents of memory or schemata).</p>   | <p><i>Examples:</i> Facial expressions, emotional appraisal, happy experience.</p>   | <p><i>Examples:</i> Needs, motives, and behavioral competencies.</p>  |



**Table 5**  
**Characteristics of the Establishment Subtypes**

| Self establishment subtype   | Self-in-world establishment subtype   | World establishment subtype  |
|--|---|--|
| <p><i>Specific functions:</i> Represents and maintains concepts of the self and its parts, including all its private personal histories, future fantasies, and other similar structures.</p>   | <p><i>Specific functions:</i> Represents specific connections between the organism and the world, including connections from emotions to their objects, from the self to the world, and from particular acts to specific situations.</p>                              | <p><i>Specific functions:</i> Represents complex information about the world, including those that represent bodies of general cultural and world knowledge.</p>   |
| <p><i>Inclusions and exclusions:</i> Includes structures with their primary focus on the self, even though these will of necessity include some information about the self-in-the-world and the world (see below). Also includes maintenance structures, such as defense and coping mechanisms, that screen out painful information and maintain consistency among concepts.</p> | <p><i>Inclusions and exclusions:</i> Includes images of the self as involved with other people, situations, or institutions, but excludes more general conceptions of the self, even though those typically include information about other people and the world.</p> | <p><i>Inclusions and exclusions:</i> Includes any general knowledge structure that contains specific contents, even though such general knowledge structures may at times be employed to define the self and the self-in-the-world (e.g., person schemata); excludes any more specific class of knowledge structure that is specifically related to the self or self-in-the-world (e.g., self-schemata).</p> |
| <p><i>Examples:</i> Identity, self-esteem, personal stories, possible self; as well as projection, denial, and perceptual defense.</p>   | <p><i>Examples:</i> Includes attached emotions and preferences, identifications and roles, and conditioned responses and situation-specific behaviors.</p>  | <p><i>Examples:</i> Includes archetypes, restaurant script, vocabulary, anything concerning implicit personality theory, or other expert knowledge.</p>  |

different perspective, despite employing a common definition. The preliminary study suggested that the classification system can be reliably used to distinguish among different types of personality components.

### **Application of the System to the Components of Table 1**

The above classification system was next applied to the components listed in Table 1. I classified and reclassified each of the components appearing in the various drafts of this article over the course of a year, and clarified the classification system where necessary. The study of inter-rater agreement (see above) prompted discussions that led to additional alterations of some classifications. The classifications were further reviewed by two colleagues and by students in a graduate seminar on personality and emotion. The certainty of a given classification, however, will be limited in part by the fact that personality theorists often describe and redescribe a given personality component in various ways. Freud, for example, has been said to employ up to 10 distinct perspectives in describing psychoanalytic theory and these perspectives lead to quite a few different depictions of the same component (Rapaport, 1960). Nonetheless, the present procedure should have ensured that most of the classifications capture at least one valid definition of a given component. The final assignments can be found listed within the right-hand, "Relational Classification" column of Table 1. A few sets of component classes were relabeled as supplemental classifications because they appeared to cut across divisions employed here in an alternative but useful way (e.g., genotypical/phenotypical/pseudodispositions).

### **A Relational Table of Personality Components**

The reclassification of the components in Table 1 at first appears disappointing because the component types are haphazardly arranged under each perspective heading. This is precisely the problem with classifying components by theoretical perspective: Such theories often fail to address how the components they have proposed should be organized. Although the components could be rearranged according to their new classifications within a given theoretical perspective, the strength of the new taxonomy is that the components can be rearranged without regard to their original perspectives at all. Figure 2 therefore rearranges the components in a single group according to their types. The four

**Table 6**  
**Characteristics of the Theme Subtypes**

| The conscious self, self-in-world, and world theme subtypes   | The cognitive self, self-in-world, and world theme subtypes  | The affective self, self-in-world, and world theme subtypes   | The conative self, self-in-world, and world theme subtypes  |
|---|--|---|---|
| <p><i>Overview of conscious subtypes:</i> Describe states concerned with high vs. low awareness directed at established representations.</p>  | <p><i>Overview of cognitive subtypes:</i> Describe cognitions or intelligences directed at or expressed in specific established representations.</p>   | <p><i>Overview of affective subtypes:</i> Describe feelings including especially those involving positive or negative feelings or interpersonal warmth or coldness.</p>   | <p><i>Overview of conative subtypes:</i> Describe qualities involving high motivation or effort directed toward specific established representations.</p>   |
| <p><i>Conscious self theme subtype:</i> Describes inner awareness of self-representations that result in inner awareness, self-reflectiveness, and private self-consciousness.</p>                              | <p><i>Cognitive self theme subtype:</i> Describes awareness of one's own internal workings, such as personal intelligence, self-awareness, and introspectiveness.</p>  | <p><i>Affective self theme subtype:</i> Describes free-floating internal emotional experiencing and its characteristic patterns. These are self themes even though many of them will secondarily color the self-in-world and world representations; the subtype includes emotional intensity and emotionality, neurotic anxiety, and stability.</p> | <p><i>Conative self theme subtype:</i> Describes internal motivations experienced in the private personality, such as impulsivity and fantasy proneness.</p>  |
| <p><i>Conscious self-in-world theme subtype:</i> Describes awareness of one's public roles or relationships in the world, such as shyness and public self-consciousness.</p>                                    | <p><i>Cognitive self-in-world theme subtype:</i> Describes cognitive activities in a person's relationships with others due to imparting knowledge, as with instructiveness or pedantry, or in using knowledge to influence others, as in Machiavellianism or social intelligence.</p> | <p><i>Affective self-in-world themes subtype:</i> Describes feelings about oneself in the world, including such feelings as egotism, narcissism, and self-respect.</p>  | <p><i>Conative self-in-world theme subtype:</i> Describes a large number of interpersonal characteristics that emerge in response to motives toward others. Examples include aggression, friendliness, and dominance.</p>   |
| <p><i>Conscious world theme subtype:</i> Describes an outer-directed "objective" awareness that potentially merges with tasks or with the world, such as flow experience, absorption, or peak experiencing.</p> | <p><i>Cognitive world theme subtype:</i> Describes the intellectual abilities and styles that arise when pursuing general knowledge, such as intellectual aptitude and intellectual achievement, as well as resulting in cognitive styles such as field dependence.</p>                | <p><i>Affective world theme subtype:</i> Results in feelings about the world and people in it, such as alienation, caring, empathy, and sympathy.</p>   | <p><i>Conative world theme subtype:</i> Describes urges and feelings that arise in response to changing the world as a whole. These motives do not involve individual or immediate responses from other people, but instead involve changing some basic aspect of the world, such as social interest and gemeinschaftsgefühl.</p> |

**Figure 2**  
**Relational Table of Personality Components**

**ESTABLISHMENTS**

**WORLD:** WORLD MODELS: anticipated consequences, causal attributions, expert knowledge, (generalized) expectancy, internal frame of reference, personal constructs, problem-focused coping, psychological situation  
**PERSON MODELS:** anima/animus, archetype, implicit personality theory, empathy (structure), unconditional positive regard, oedipal/electra complex, personality prototypes, respondent behavior, significant other schemata

**SELF-IN-WORLD:** COMPLEX STRUCTURES: style of life, ethical/moral structure, conscience, fem./masc. clock, self-obj. introject  
**ATTACHED COMPLEXES/ROLES:** (in)congruence, face, gender identity, identification, jonah complex, organ inferiority, overcompensation, persona, role playing  
**ATTACHED MOTIVATIONS:** conditioned response, inferiority/superior. complex, learned helplessness, life themes, minimal goal level, moving away/against/toward, need -potential, -value, -for identity/rootedness/etc., personal -projects, -strivings, reality principle, secondary drive, self-efficacy  
**ATTACHED EMOTIONS:** approach-avoidance conflict, conditioned emotional reaction, developmental characteristics (trust-mistrust, etc.), habit, moral/neurotic anxiety, penis/womb envy, preferences, psychosocial strengths (hope, will, etc.), reinforcement value, secondary appraisal, sentiment

**SELF:** proprium, self (as known), self system  
**SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS:** current concerns, peak experience, daydreaming  
**IDENTITY:** ego identity, identity achievement/moratorium/foreclosure/diffusion, life-story identity, meta-need, scripts/nuclear scenes, self -concept, -esteem, -identity, -image, -integrity, -schema  
**EXTENSIONS:** self -extension, -objectification, -regulation, -reinforcement  
**POSSIBLE SELVES:** actual, ideal, ought, ego-ideal, possible selves, self/shadow/ego  
**COPING AND DEFENSE:** emotion-focused coping, defense mechanisms (e.g., denial, projection, repression, suppress.), fixation, openness to experience/defensiveness, perceptual-defense/distortion, subception

**CONSCIOUS WORLD:**  
flow, mitwelt

**CONSCIOUS SELF-IN-WORLD:**  
public self-consciousness, shyness, umwelt

**CONSCIOUS SELF:**  
absorption, depersonalization, eigenwelt, private self-consciousness, self-monitoring

**COGNITIVE WORLD:**  
creativity, field dependence/field independence, freedom of movement, intelligence, locus of control

**COGNITIVE SELF-IN-WORLD:**  
openness/closedness, pedantry, social intelligence, shrewdness

**COGNITIVE SELF:**  
intrinsic intellectuality, personal intelligence, self-awareness

**AFFECTIVE WORLD:**  
empathy (as trait), gemeinschaftsgefühl

**AFFECTIVE SELF-IN-WORLD:**  
extraversion/introversion, friendliness/hostility, tough-mindedness/tender-mindedness, suspiciousness, well-being


**AFFECTIVE SELF:**  
affectothymia, ego-strength, guilt-proneness, pleasant/unpleasantness, arousal/calm, neuroticism/stability, self-esteem, surgency

**THEME:**

**CONATIVE WORLD:**  
authoritarianism, curiosity, interest, social interest

**CONATIVE SELF-IN-WORLD:**  
n. achievement/affiliation/power, acquiescence, adventurousness, conscientiousness, carelessness, dominance, isolation, machiavellianism, masculinity/femininity/androgyny, narcissism, nonconformity, social desirability, superego strength

**CONATIVE SELF:**  
propriate striving, sensation-seeking



**CONSCIOUSNESS:** conscious, consciousness  
**ATTENTION AND AWARENESS:** attention/awareness/energy, Dasein, introspection  
**SUBSTRUCTURES AND PROCESSES:** attentional processes, automatization/deautomatization, experiential field, stream of thought/stream of subjective life, substantive/transitive resting place

**COGNITION:** MENTAL MODELS: modeling, mental models  
**REPRESENTATIONAL PROCESSES:** circumspection-preemption control cycle, dreamwork, enantiomorphism, imaginal/verbal processes, functions, primary/secondary process, transference  
**LONG-TERM MEMORY STRUCTURES:** long-term memory, episodic/semantic memory, goals, procedural knowledge, prototype, schema, scripts (as structures)  
**SHORT-TERM MEMORY PROCESSES:** encoding, mood-cong./state dependent memory process, rehearsal, mood/spreading activation, short-term/working memory, subliminal psychodynamic activation  
**PERCEPTION:** attention, feature detectors, pattern recognition

**AFFECT:** emotion  
**EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE:** emotional experience, joy, acceptance, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation, happiness, basic anxiety/basic hostility, realistic anxiety, affect  
**PRECURSOR PROCESSES:** primary appraisal, frustration (of drives), threat (to self)  
**MOTOR CONCOMITANTS:** Duchenne smile, emotional facial expression

**CONATION:** BASIC MOTIVATIONS: pleasure principle, needs (for abasement, etc.), need for positive self regard, self/actualizing tendency, b(eing)-d(eficiency) love, growth motive, physiological/safety/love/esteem/self-actualization needs, striving for superiority, will to power  
**BASIC BEHAVIORS:** emitted-, instinctive-, operant-, behavior, unconditioned response, primary drive, behavioral competencies/deficits, motor reproduction processes  
**STRUCTURED MENTAL ENERGY:** (anti) cathexis, canalization, libido  
**BASIC ENERGY SOURCES:** erg, instinctoid need, life/death instincts

**Id:** includes some self, self-in-world, supported by some memory representation, and dominated by conation and affect. **Ego:** includes most self, self-in-world, and world, excluding superego components, and supported most closely by cognition cf., **Totalitarian Ego.** **Self (as Knower):** includes the self (as known), the stream of consciousness, feelings, memories, etc. **Superego:** includes world establishments of conscience, ethical systems, etc., some possible selves, and most cognition, some conation. **Private Personality:** includes self, self-related themes, integrating consciousness, cognition, affect, and conation. **Unconscious:** includes unconscious drives and emotions, primary process, and considerable fantasy life supported by associationistic cognitions and imagistic thinking, cf., **Collective/Personal Unconscious.** Also: **Preconscious, Unconscious Proper, Character Neurosis**

**AGENCIES**

**ENABLER:**

Note. The four types of components (enablers, establishments, themes, and agencies) are arranged around the four corners of the figure. Them boxes are positioned so that each is in the column of the enabler and the row of the establishment to which it is most related. Arrows extend from the enablers to the establishments to indicate that the enablers support the establishments. Each classification box contains those components classified as falling within it. The enabler and establishment components have been grouped into subcategories (IN SMALL CAPS), and appear in order from largest to smallest. Agencies (bottom left) are followed in some instances by the components that make them up.

basic types of components are arranged around the four corners of the table of personality components to reflect their relations to one another. As in Figure 1, the four types of enablers (conscious, cognitive, affective, conative) appear at the bottom right. The three types of establishments (self, self-in-world, world) appear at the top left. Their relative positions indicate their locations at the lower and upper level of psychological functioning. Arrows extend from the enablers to the establishments to indicate their interconnectedness across levels. On an informal basis, I subdivided the components that appear in the enabler and establishment subtype boxes into further subcategories arranged from the larger ones at the top of each box to the smaller ones at the bottom. For example, cognition-related enablers were divided into "mental models," "long-term memory structures," and "perception" subcategories, among others. (These subcategory names appear in small capital letters to differentiate them from components.)

The 12 classes of themes form their own  $3 \times 4$  grid of boxes in the top right of the figure. Each theme subtype box is positioned in the grid directly above the specific enabler and directly to the right of the specific establishment to which it is most closely related. For instance, the cognitive world themes (beginning with creativity and field dependence) are above the cognitive enablers and to the right of the world establishments.

Finally, a list of the agencies appears in the lower left-hand corner of the figure. Certain of these agencies are followed by a suggestive list of components that may make them up (as space permitted).

Most components of Table 1 appear in Figure 2 with several exceptions. There were six category names in Table 1: need, needs, developmental characteristics, psychosocial strengths, dreamwork, and functions, that were each followed by a list of like-classified specific components. The six category names appear in Figure 2, followed by one or two examples to clarify their meanings in most instances, but the 59 or so components from the subsidiary lists were not included for reasons of space. Another 21 supplemental classification groups (e.g., cardinal/primary/secondary traits) were not included because although they can be used as adjuncts to the present classification system, they do not easily fit within the present table of personality components. An additional 7 components appeared within the notes of Table 1 as synonyms of other components and were excluded. A final 20 or so components appeared more than once in Table 1 because they were con-

ceptualized differently by different theorists (e.g., extraversion, anger, anxiety, ideal self, etc.), and these appear only once each in Figure 2. In all, roughly 280 personality components are represented in Figure 2.

### Initial Summary and Discussion of the Framework

The relational table of personality components depicted in Figure 2 has some clear advantages over the perspective-by-perspective classification of Table 1. First, the major categories are few and appear organized and appropriately distinguished from one another. For example, enablers and establishments are subdivided in markedly different groupings (i.e., consciousness/cognition/affect/conation vs. self/self-in-world/world) as they should be if their theoretical separation is meaningful. Second, the major categories seem interconnected in a positive sense. For example, the layout of enablers and establishments clarifies the breakdown of the themes. The fact that the subtypes of enablers and establishments should clarify the organization of themes in this way suggests that the framework leads in a productive direction. In turn, agencies can be defined as composites of particular enablers, establishments, and themes. A third advantage of the classification system is that the specific categories classify together those components that are related. For example, the self-in-world establishment category of "Attached Complexes/Roles" contains the role-related concepts of congruence (humanistic), persona (psychodynamic), and role playing (social cognitive). This permits better comparisons and contrasts among components than does a perspective-by-perspective system.

The major divisions employed to classify terms in Figure 2 appear to have adequate reliability. Still, placement of more than a few components is a matter of judgment. For example, should depersonalization be a theme or an establishment? Depersonalization was classified as a conscious-self theme here, but were another psychologist to recommend moving it to another part of the figure, the result would be an equally justified framework. Two centuries ago, Thomas Reid wrote of his work organizing faculties that "[t]he powers of the mind are so many, so various, and so connected and complicated in most of its operations, that there never has been any division of them proposed which is not liable to considerable objection" (Reid, 1785, p. 67). This statement is as true of the present system as it was of Reid's own work.

I would nonetheless argue that the strengths of a relational classification scheme such as the present one outweigh the necessary ambiguities accompanying it. Figure 2 completes the proposed reclassification of personality components.

### **General Discussion**

Psychologists have expended considerable energy studying personality components. Roughly 400 such components regularly appear in the glossaries of personality textbooks, and each is a model of a part of personality. The relational table of personality components presented here is essentially a model of such models. By organizing together the different components into various types and subtypes, the framework presents a global view of how some of our theory and research concerning components fits together.

In one sense, the framework constructed here pieces together ideas already present within the field. Such categories of components as faculties, schemas and complexes, traits, and larger divisions of personality find their echoes in the new categories of enablers, establishments, themes, and agencies. The older categories evolved for the most part in a piecemeal fashion and were rarely compared to one another. In contrast, this article has outlined the theoretical bases necessary for a unified consideration of such categories. Newly evolved categories based on the older ones have been described in a common language for the first time so that they are individually clear as well as conceptually distinct from one another. Finally, these new categories of enablers, establishments, themes, and agencies have been shown to be collectively useful for encompassing most major personality components studied today.

Although a framework such as the present one includes most or all proposed personality components, it is not a complete model of personality. A complete model of personality would organize the components not only according to their formal interrelations, but also by specifying the dynamic actions among them, such as whether they are operating in a manner consistent or in conflict with one another (cf. Maddi, 1972). Thus, a model of models such as the present one forms an intermediate step to a more complete model of personality. How it might lead to a more complete model will be discussed below. Before doing so, however, it is worth considering alternatives to the present classification system.

### Alternative Classification Systems

The present system was based on a specific set of distinctions among personality components that were not necessarily the only ones that could have been made. For example, rather than employing such distinctions as between mechanistic and featural structures, or upper versus lower level locations, it might have been possible to reclassify components by emphasizing their heritability, consciousness-unconsciousness, or some entirely different dimension. Nor were the enabler, establishment, theme, and agency types and their subtypes employed here the only ones that could have been described. A neurological type of component, occupying a position below the lower level employed here, might have been added (i.e., including components such as the corpus callosum). Thematic subtypes linking two types of enablers together also might have been added (e.g., emotional intelligence, conscious motivations). This raises the possibility that other equally plausible classification systems alternative or supplemental to the present one might well enrich the understanding and integration of the components. The present classification system, however, is a strong model given its comprehensiveness and the number of relationships among the components it represents. Whether or not alternative classifications are developed, the present system can contribute on its own to personality description and research in ways that are outlined below.

### Contributions to the Description of Personality

The exposition of personality psychology, including its definitions and descriptions, should be as technically specific and accurate as possible. For example, personality is often described as something like "the organization of psychological components into a coherent, dynamic (and individual) pattern" (cf. Mayer, 1994; Pervin, 1990). This is a good definition that runs into problems only should someone ask what these psychological components precisely are. If the author of such a general statement strictly adheres to a particular theoretical perspective, he or she might reply from that perspective. Thus, the psychodynamic psychologist can reply, "id, ego, and superego," and the trait psychologist can reply "ability, temperamental, and dynamic traits," and so on. The present framework makes clear how much both psychologists would be leaving out in such a reply. The present framework indicates that personality could be better defined as the organization of personality



components of several types, including those components that carry out basic mental functions such as consciousness, cognition, affect, and conation, those components that represent knowledge of the self and the surrounding world, those components that are formed from thematically related qualities and that direct action in coherent patterns such as those of sensation seeking or intelligence, and finally, components constructed from the first three that may function as mini- or subpersonalities. This definition has the advantage of more precisely specifying the parts that make up personality. Because it is more specific, it may also be more open to criticism; but such specificity and any consequent criticisms which lead to its modification for the better will promote growth in the field.

Descriptions of specific components can also be improved by the present system. Consider the definition of identity. Definitions of identity typically deal either in general terms with an individual's self-concept or self-esteem and the like, or in vaguer terms of an individual's "self-schema." A better specification of identity becomes possible by taking into account a number of specific identity-related components. For example, identity could be described as follows (those who study identity could improve on this definition): "A person's multifaceted concept of who he or she is. Identity includes an experiential sense of oneself that resides in consciousness and in working memory, as well as an ability to reflect back on oneself, heightening one's self-consciousness. Identity involves considerable knowledge of, feelings about, and motivations toward the self, including self-images, scripts, life stories, possible selves, and other related concepts. Finally, identity may be characterized by particular themes such as self-awareness, ego-strength, or confidence." The specificity of this definition is encouraged by a framework that places related components together. It could be argued that such a definition is too well-specified in the sense that it relies on relationships whose validity is not entirely established. If so, such a definition at least makes clear where further research needs to take place.

Another descriptive contribution of such a framework is to education. Students can learn about the components of personality in a comprehensive, nonsectarian fashion when these components are classified into a relational framework. Such an exposition may be far better suited to contemporary psychology than the more traditional theory-by-theory approach so widely employed at present.

A final descriptive contribution may relate to issues of personality

assessment. Conducting a comprehensive personality assessment requires assessing those personality components relevant to the matter at hand. Although commonly employed assessment techniques exist for some components, other components have missed assessment almost entirely. For example, intelligence tests assess the function of enablers such as memory and judgment, and personality scales assess various themes, but fewer instruments exist to assess such establishments as interpersonal perception or roles.

### Contributions to Research in Psychology

Another potential use of the framework will be to support theory-based research in the field. Most obviously, the present framework encourages the contemporary focus on the discriminant and convergent validity of similar personality components. Most researchers, of course, are already sensitive to the possible overlap among such similar components as the self, the self-concept, and self-esteem. Nonetheless, a framework such as the present one can serve as a reminder to compare and contrast a given concept with those most closely related to it. Less obviously, the present framework motivates the search for missing or understudied components. For example, there may be more themes that connect consciousness to the world than have been formulated thus far.

The present framework also highlights the need to develop methodological criteria for the acceptance of a given personality component. Different criteria may be necessary for different types of components. For example, among psychologists who study cognitive enablers, the experimental method is typically employed to divide components. Thus, Baddeley (1986) recommended the distinction between working and long-term memory based on a research program that carefully teases out the independent function of the two through carefully controlled task environments. Each experiment is specifically designed to better distinguish the working/long-term memory division in a manner that is a contemporary update of the informal observations of independent faculties employed by Mendelssohn (1755/1971).

Quite different methods are employed by theme researchers. Here, test items representing particular parts of themes are composed into surveys. Next, the test items are administered and intercorrelated with one another. This is followed by the application of structural mathematical techniques such as factor analysis that group the items together in order to identify one or more related (or unrelated) themes. Such

procedures are the contemporary version of the individual differences logic for identifying components outlined by Allport (1937).

It is worth asking why personality components such as cognitive enablers are studied experimentally, whereas themes are studied correlative (e.g., with factor analysis). Rather than being an accident of history, such different methods may themselves reflect the formal differences between the two types of components. Because enablers are mechanisms, they can be manipulated and their limits tested to better define their boundaries. Themes, however, are both more fluid and less distinct collections of features. Factorial breakdowns of themes may well provide the optimal description of them. Interestingly, establishments, which are somewhere between enablers and themes in their internal organization, have had both experimental and factor-analytic approaches applied to them (e.g., identity; Fitts, 1964–1965; Higgins, 1987).

### **Special Advantages of the Framework**

A framework such as the present also can contribute to modeling personality as a whole. Most fields in which complex systems are studied build models of their overall system's behavior. Thus, economists employ computer models of the economy; meteorologists, computer models of the atmosphere. Computer models of personality have also arisen, although to date they have not been as vigorously pursued. Certain early computer models such as Aldous and ELIZA are fairly widely remembered for their pioneer status in the field (Loehlin, 1968; Weizenbaum, 1965). More recent computer models of human cognition have had direct influences on the acceptance of particular personality components. SAM's dramatic simulations of human understanding did much to popularize the notion of the schemas and scripts it employed (Schank & Abelson, 1977). HAM did much to popularize spreading activation (Anderson & Bower, 1979). If related fields are any guide, computer models of personality will gradually become a valuable scientific adjunct to our discipline. They will incorporate our various smaller component models into larger scale approximations of personality structure. If this is to be the case, a framework such as the present one can serve as a checklist of possible subsystems to be modeled in such future computer representations.

An outline of such components inevitably raises questions concerning how these components are organized and interact. Many of the

answers already exist in our various psychological literatures; many more await to be discovered; and all could be pertinent to new, more comprehensive models of personality.

### Conclusion

In closing, it is worth emphasizing the power of the relational classification system in the present. The system's power is partly exhibited in the questions it raises concerning personality components. For example, how are cognitive and affective components different from one another and how do they interact? Which components are most necessary to define a person? The system's power is also exhibited in the way it permits the specification of certain questions. For example, the question "Does personality change or stay the same over time?" is almost too vague to answer; but it can be recast with the help of the relational table as "Which types of personality components will change and which will stay the same over time?" The relational classification system is most powerful of all, however, in providing a meaning-structure for thinking about personality components. Its emphasis on the relation among components enables the person using it to keep in mind more components than would otherwise be possible. Thus, relatively obscure but potentially important components need not be forgotten amidst all the rest. Instead, a century's work on personality components can be synthesized within a single representation of personality that is both multifaceted and whole.

### REFERENCES

- Adler, A. (1964). *Social interest: A challenge to mankind* (J. Linton & R. Vaughan, Trans.). New York: Capricorn Books.
- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Allport, G. W. (1937). *Personality: A psychological interpretation*. New York: Holt.
- Allport, G. W. (1961). *Pattern and growth in personality*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Anderson, J. R., & Bower, G. H. (1979). *Human associative memory*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Anderson, S. M., & Cole, S. W. (1990). "Do I know you?": The role of significant others in general social perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59, 384-399.
- Angyal, A. (1941). *Foundations for a science of personality*. New York: Viking.
- Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system

- and its control processes. In K. W. Spence & J. T. Spence (Eds.), *The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in theory and research* (Vol. 2). New York: Academic Press.
- Averill, J. R. (1992). The structural bases of emotional behavior: A metatheoretical analysis. *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, *13*, 1–24.
- Baddeley, A. D. (1986). *Working memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bakan, D. (1966). *The duality of human existence: Isolation and communion in Western man*. Boston: Beacon.
- Bandura, A. (1969). *Principles of behavior modification*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Bandura, A. (1977). *Social learning theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Barratt, E. S. (1985). Impulsiveness defined within a systems model of personality. In C. D. Spielberger & J. N. Butcher (Eds.), *Advances in personality assessment* (Vol. 5, pp. 113–132). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Bartlett, F. C. (1932). *Remembering: An experimental and social study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bem, S. L. (1974). The measurement of psychological androgyny. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, *42*, 165–172.
- Binswanger, H. (1972). Theoretical and graphological aspects of compulsive illnesses. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, *9*, 83–93.
- Block, J., & Block, J. H. (1980). The role of ego-control and ego resiliency in the organization of behavior. In W. A. Collins (Ed.), *The Minnesota symposium on child psychology* (Vol. 13, pp. 33–101). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Boss, M. (1963). *Psychoanalysis and daseinsanalysis*. New York: DaCapo Press.
- Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. *American Psychologist*, *36*, 129–148.
- Brown, J. A. (1958). Some tests on the decay theory of immediate memory. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *10*, 12–21.
- Bruner, J., & Postman, L. (1947). Emotional selectivity in perception and reaction. *Journal of Personality*, *16*, 69–75.
- Bruner, J. S., & Taguiri, R. (1954). The perception of people. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 634–654). Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Buss, A. H., & Finn, S. E. (1987). Classification of personality traits. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *52*, 432–444.
- Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix. *Psychological Bulletin*, *56*, 81–105.
- Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. (1977). Traits as prototypes: Effects on recognition memory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *35*, 38–48.
- Cattell, R. B. (1965). *The scientific analysis of personality*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Cattell, R. B., & Warburton, F. W. (1967). *Objective personality and motivation tests*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Cheek, J. M., & Buss, A. H. (1981). Shyness and sociability. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *41*, 330–339.
- Chi, M., Glaser, R., & Farr, M. J. (1988). *The nature of expertise*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Christie, R., & Geis, F. L. (Eds.). (1970). *Studies in Machiavellianism*. New York: Academic Press.

- Couch, A., & Keniston, K. (1960). Yeasayers and neysayers: Agreeing response set as a personality variable. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, **60**, 151–174.
- Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, **24**, 349–354.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). *Flow: The psychology of optimal experience*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **44**, 113–126.
- deRivera, J. (1977). *A structural theory of the emotions*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Deikman, A. J. (1966). Deautomatization and mystic experience. *Psychiatry*, **29**, 324–328.
- Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. *Psychological Bulletin*, **95**, 542–575.
- Dollard, J., & Miller, N. E. (1950). *Personality and psychotherapy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Edwards, A. L. (1953). The relationship between the judged desirability of a trait and the probability that the trait will be endorsed. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, **37**, 90–93.
- Ekman, P., Davidson, R. J., & Friesen, W. V. (1990). The Duchenne smile: Emotional expression and brain physiology II. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **58**, 342–353.
- Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **17**, 124–129.
- Emmons, R. A. (1986). Personal strivings: An approach to personality and subjective well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **51**, 1058–1068.
- Emmons, R. A. (1987). Narcissism: Theory and measurement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **52**, 11–17.
- Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1980). Verbal reports as data. *Psychological Review*, **87**, 215–251.
- Erikson, E. H. (1963). *Childhood and society* (2nd ed.). New York: Norton.
- Erikson, E. H. (1982). *The life cycle completed: A review*. New York: Norton.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1982). *Personality, genetics, and behavior*. New York: Praeger.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1990). Biological dimensions of personality. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 244–276). New York: Guilford.
- Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, **43**, 522–527.
- Fitts, W. H. (1964–1965). *Tennessee Self-Concept Scale manual*. Nashville: Counselor Recordings and Tapes.
- Freud, A. (1966). *The ego and the mechanisms of defense* (C. Baines, Trans.) (Rev. ed.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1937)
- Freud, S. (1949). *An outline of psycho-analysis* (J. Strachey, Trans.) (Rev. ed.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1940)
- Freud, S. (1950). *Beyond the pleasure principle* (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: Liveright. (Original work published 1920)

- Freud, S. (1959). *Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety* (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1926)
- Freud, S. (1960). *The ego and the id* (J. Strachey, Trans.; J. Riviere, Ed.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1923)
- Freud, S. (1965). *The interpretation of dreams* (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1900)
- Freud, S. (1965). *New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis* (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1933)
- Freud, S. (1966). *Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis* (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1917)
- Fromm, E. (1955). *The sane society*. New York: Rinehart & Co.
- Galton, F. (1973). *Inquiries into human faculty and its development*. London: Macmillan. (Original work published 1883)
- Gardner, H. (1983). *Frames of mind*. New York: Basic Books.
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction ritual: Essays in face-to-face behavior*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Goldberg, L. R. (1993). The structure of phenotypic personality traits. *American Psychologist*, *48*, 26–34.
- Greenwald, A. (1980). The totalitarian ego. *American Psychologist*, *35*, 603–618.
- Grossberg, S., & Wyse, L. (1991). A neural network architecture for figure-ground separation of connected scenic features. *Neural-Networks*, *4*, 723–742.
- Hall, C. S., & Lindzey, G. (1978). *Theories of personality* (3rd ed.). New York: Wiley.
- Helson, R., Mitchell, V., & Moane, G. (1984). Personality patterns of adherence and nonadherence to the social clock. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *46*, 1079–1096.
- Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review*, *94*, 319–340.
- Hilgard, E. R. (1980). The trilogy of mind: Cognition, affection, and conation. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *16*, 107–117.
- Hjelle, L. A., & Ziegler, D. J. (1992). *Personality theories* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Hogan, R. (1983). A socioanalytic theory of personality. In M. M. Page (Ed.), *Personality, current theory and research: Nebraska symposium on motivation 1982* (pp. 55–90). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Horney, K. (1937). *The neurotic personality of our time*. New York: Norton.
- Horney, K. (1945). *Our inner conflicts*. New York: Norton.
- Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1959). Receptive fields of single neurones in the cat's visual cortex. *Journal of Physiology*, *148*, 574–591.
- Hull, C. L. (1943). *Principles of behavior*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- James, W. (1920). *Psychology: Briefer course*. New York: Holt. (Original work published 1892)
- Jung, C. G. (1923). *Psychological types* (H. G. Baynes, Trans.). New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co. (Original work published 1921)
- Jung, C. G. (1953). On the psychology of the unconscious. In C. G. Jung, *Two essays on analytical psychology* (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.) (pp. 17–130). Cleveland: World Publishing. (Original work published 1943)
- Jung, C. G. (1953). The relations between the ego and the unconscious. In C. G.

- Jung, *Two essays on analytical psychology* (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.) (pp. 136–253). Cleveland: World Publishing. (Original work published 1945)
- Kelly, G. A. (1955). *The psychology of personal constructs: Volume 1. A theory of personality*. New York: Norton.
- Kihlstrom, J. F. (1990). The psychological unconscious. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 445–464). New York: Guilford.
- Klinger, E. (1977). *Meaning and void: Inner experiences and the incentives in people's lives*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kohlberg, L. (1973). Continuities in childhood and adult moral development revisited. In P. Baltes & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), *Life-span developmental psychology* (pp. 179–204). New York: Academic Press.
- Kohut, H. (1971). *The analysis of the self*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). *Stress, appraisal, and coping*. New York: Springer.
- Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality*. New York: Ronald Press.
- Lewis, C. S. (1970). *The discarded image*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lloyd, J., & Barenblatt, L. (1984). Intrinsic intellectuality: Its relations to social class, intelligence, and achievement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **46**, 646–654.
- Loehlin, J. C. (1968). *Computer models of personality*. New York: Random House.
- Maddi, S. R. (1972). *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **3**, 551–558.
- Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **35**, 63–78.
- Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. *American Psychologist*, **41**, 954–969.
- Maslow, A. H. (1968). *Toward a psychology of being* (2nd ed.). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
- Maslow, A. H. (1970). *Motivation and personality* (2nd ed.). New York: Harper and Row.
- Maslow, A. H. (1971). *The farther reaches of human nature*. New York: Penguin.
- May, R. (1958). Contributions of existential psychotherapy. In R. May, E. Nagel, & H. F. Ellenberger (Eds.), *Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology* (pp. 37–91). New York: Basic Books.
- Mayer, J. D. (1994). A system-topics framework for the study of personality. *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality*, **13**, 99–123.
- McAdams, D. P. (1987). A life-story model of identity. In R. Hogan & W. H. Jones (Eds.), *Perspectives in personality* (Vol. 2, pp. 15–50). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- McAdams, D. P. (1990). *The person: An introduction to personality psychology*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- McClelland, D. C. (1984a). Interrelation among the basic personality variables: Predicting the concrete act. In D. C. McClelland (Ed.), *Motives, personality, and society: Selected papers* (pp. 177–183). New York: Praeger.
- McClelland, D. C. (1984b). *Motives, personality, and society*. New York: Praeger.
- McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1985). Updating Norman's "adequate taxonomy":



- Intelligence and personality dimensions in natural language and questionnaires. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **49**, 710–729.
- McDougall, W. (1923). *An introduction to social psychology* (15th ed.). Boston: J. W. Luce.
- Mehrabian, A., & Epstein, N. (1972). A measure of emotional empathy. *Journal of Personality*, **40**, 525–543.
- Mendelssohn, M. (1971). *Moses Mendelssohn: Gesammelte Schriften Jubiläumsausgabe (Band 1: Schriften zur Philosophie und Ästhetik)*. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Gunther Holzboog). (Original work published 1755)
- Mendelssohn, M. (1969). *Jerusalem* (A. Jospe, Trans. & Ed.). New York: Schocken. (Original work published 1783)
- Mischel, W. (1993). *Introduction to personality* (5th ed.). Ft. Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Murphy, G. (1947). *Personality: A biosocial approach to origins and structure*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Murray, H. A. (1938). *Explorations in personality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Murray, H. A., & Kluckhohn, C. (1956). Outline of a conception of personality. In C. Kluckhohn & H. A. Murray (Eds.), *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (2nd ed., pp. 3–49). New York: Knopf.
- Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. C. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. *Psychological Review*, **84**, 231–259.
- Norman, W. T. (1963). Toward an adequate taxonomy of personality attributes: Replicated factor structure in peer nomination personality ratings. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, **66**, 574–583.
- Ornstein, R. (1986). *The psychology of consciousness*. New York: Viking Penguin.
- Orwell, L., & Perlmutter, L. (1990). The study of wise persons: Integrating a personality perspective. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 160–177). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Palys, T. S., & Little, B. R. (1983). Perceived life satisfaction and the organization of personal project systems. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **44**, 1221–1230.
- Pervin, L. A. (1990). A brief history of modern personality theory. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality theory and research* (pp. 3–8). New York: Guilford.
- Pervin, L. A. (1993). *Personality: Theory and research* (6th ed.). New York: Wiley.
- Peterson, L. R., & Peterson, M. J. (1959). Short-term retention of individual verbal items. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, **58**, 193–198.
- Plutchik, R. (1980). *Emotion: A psychoevolutionary synthesis*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Polyshyn, Z. W. (1984). *Computation and cognition*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rapaport, D. (1960). The structure of psychoanalytic theory: A systematizing attempt [Monograph]. *Psychological Issues*, **2**(2), 1–158.
- Reid, T. (1785). *Essays on the intellectual powers of man*. Mentson, Yorkshire, England: Scholar Press [reproduction, 1971].
- Rogers, C. R. (1951). *Client-centered therapy*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Rogers, C. R. (1961). Significant learning: In therapy and in education. In C. R. Rogers (Ed.), *On becoming a person* (pp. 279–296). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

- Rogers, C. R. (1989). *The Carl Rogers reader* (H. Kirschenbaum & V. L. Henderson, Eds.). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Rosch, E. H., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories. *Cognitive Psychology*, *7*, 573-605.
- Rosch, E. H., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., & Boyers-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories. *Cognitive Psychology*, *8*, 382-489.
- Rotter, J. B. (1954). *Social learning and clinical psychology*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Rotter, J. B. (1975). Some problems and misconceptions related to the construct of internal versus external reinforcement. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, *43*, 56-67.
- Russell, J. A. (1979). Affective space is bipolar. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *37*, 345-356.
- Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). *Scripts, plans, goals and understanding*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). *Helplessness: On depression, development, and death*. San Francisco: Freeman.
- Silverman, L. H. (1976). Psychoanalytic theory: The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated. *American Psychologist*, *31*, 621-637.
- Singer, J. L. (1966). *Daydreaming: An introduction to the experimental study of inner experience*. New York: Random House.
- Singer, J. L. (1984). The private personality. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *10*, 7-30.
- Skinner, B. F. (1938). *The behavior of organisms: An experiential analysis*. New York: Appleton-Century-Croft.
- Skinner, B. F. (1974). *About behaviorism*. New York: Knopf.
- Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *30*, 526-537.
- Spearman, C. (1904). "General intelligence" objectively determined and measured. *American Journal of Psychology*, *15*, 201-293.
- Sullivan, H. S. (1953). *Conceptions of modern psychiatry*. New York: Norton.
- Tart, C. T. (1975). *States of consciousness*. New York: Dutton.
- Tellegen, A., & Atkinson, G. (1974). Openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences ("absorption"), a trait related to hypnotic susceptibility. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, *43*, 111-122.
- Thorndike, R. L. (1936). Factor analysis of social and abstract intelligence. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, *27*, 231-233.
- Thurstone, L. L. (1947). *Multiple factor analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tomkins, S. S. (1962). *Affect, imagery, consciousness* (Vol. 1). New York: Springer.
- Tomkins, S. S. (1978). Script theory: Differential magnification of affects. In H. E. Howe, Jr., & R. A. Dienstbier (Eds.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (Vol. 26, pp. 201-236). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Treisman, A. M. (1964). Selective attention in man. *British Medical Bulletin*, *20*, 12-16.
- Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), *Organization of memory* (pp. 381-403). New York: Academic Press.

- Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic memory. *Psychological Review*, **80**, 352–373.
- von Bertalanffy, L. (1967). *Robots, men, and minds*. New York: Braziller.
- von Bertalanffy, L. (1975). *Perspectives on general systems theory* (E. Tashdijian, Ed.). New York: Braziller.
- von Gebsattel, V. E. (1958). The world of the compulsive. In R. May, E. Angel, & H. F. Ellenberger (Eds.), *Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology* (pp. 170–187). New York: Basic Books.
- Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, **3**, 1–14.
- Wechsler, D. (1974). Cognitive, conative, and non-intellective intelligence. In A. J. Edwards (Ed.), *Selected papers of David Wechsler* (pp. 39–48). New York: Academic Press.
- Wechsler, D. (1981). WAIS-R manual: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Revised. San Antonio: Psychological Corporation.
- Weiner, B. (1990). Attribution in personality psychology. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 465–484). New York: Guilford.
- Weizenbaum, J. (1965). ELIZA—A computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine. *Communication of the Association for Computer Machinery*, **9**, 36–45.
- Westen, D. (1991). Social cognition and object relations. *Psychological Bulletin*, **109**, 429–455.
- Wiggins, J. S. (1979). A psychological taxonomy of trait-descriptive terms: The interpersonal domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **37**, 395–412.
- Witkin, H. A., Dyk, R. B., Faterson, H. F., Goodenough, D. R., & Karp, S. A. (1962). *Psychological differentiation*. New York: Wiley.
- Wolman, B. B., & Ullman, M. (Eds.). (1986). *Handbook of states of consciousness*. New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold.
- Wundt, W. (1897). *Outlines of psychology* (C. H. Judd, Trans.). Leipzig: Wilhelm Englemann. (Original work published 1896)
- Yorburg, B. (1974). Psychoanalysis and women's liberation. *Psychoanalytic Review*, **61**, 71–77.
- Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. *American Psychologist*, **35**, 151–175.
- Zuckerman, M. (1979). *Sensation seeking: Beyond the optimal level of arousal*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

*Manuscript received May 28, 1993; revised May 17, 1994.*